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Why Central Bankers Should Disclose: Interest Rate Forecast

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Abstract

This paper deals with theoretical and empirical dimension of publishing interest rates projections by central banks. Its first goal is to review arguments in favor of and against this decision and to illustrate the debate using experience of four central banks which publish or used to publish interest rates forecast. The second objective is to evaluate the Czech National Bank’s capability to efficiently use publishing of its interest rates forecasts to increase further its transparency, accountability and credibility. The authors argue that (i) the CNB meets all requirements needed for making its interest rate forecast public; (ii) more specifically, they do not find any evidence of significantly worse CNB’s performance in interest rates forecasting compared to other institutions; (iii) it is not clear whether the risk assessment in combination with verbal description of interest rate forecast currently used has always been sufficiently precise guidance for the market participants; (iv) after the CNB starts publishing interest rates forecasts in 2008, market expectations will probably move closer to the CNB’s view which should in turn enhance accountability and credibility of the CNB’s forecasts and improve the efficiency of its monetary policy conduct at all.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Filacek & Luboš Komárek & Petr Král, 2007. "Why Central Bankers Should Disclose: Interest Rate Forecast," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 558-576, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:558-576
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    1. Jeffery D. Amato & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 18(4), pages 495-503.
    2. Javier Gómez & José Darío Uribe & Hernando Vargas, 2002. "The Implementation Of Inflation Targeting In Colombia," Borradores de Economia 3603, Banco de la Republica.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kateøina Šmídková & Aleš Bulíø, 2007. "Striving to Be “Clearly Open” and “Crystal Clear”: Monetary Policy Communication of the CNB," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 540-557, December.
    2. Alex Isakov & Petr Grishin & Oleg Gorlinsky, 2018. "Fear of Forward Guidance," Russian Journal of Money and Finance, Bank of Russia, vol. 77(4), pages 84-106, December.
    3. Böhm, Jiří & Král, Petr & Saxa, Branislav, 2012. "The Czech National Bank's monetary policy in the media," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 341-357.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank; interest rate; forecast;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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