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Divisional managers' compensation to maximize spillovers and cooperation

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  • Pandher, Gurupdesh S.
  • Vu, Joseph D.

Abstract

The ability of multidivisional firms to capitalize on their spillover synergies and encourage cross-divisional cooperation can play an important determinant of competitive advantage. We study these issues in an agency framework where headquarters maximize total expected firm returns by providing managers incentives based on firm equity and divisional profits. The resulting incentives serve as a rich alignment mechanism for enhancing total firm returns and provide new insights. An interesting model insight is that, although spillover effects arise spontaneously from own-division effort and incentives are costly to provide, managers with larger spillovers should receive higher equity incentives. The return-maximizing incentives also encourage greater cooperation from managers with riskier divisional performance and have useful implications for leveraging spillover and collaborative capabilities in various organizational forms (e.g., conglomerates, M-form, ‘upstream’ divisions).

Suggested Citation

  • Pandher, Gurupdesh S. & Vu, Joseph D., 2018. "Divisional managers' compensation to maximize spillovers and cooperation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 44-54.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:54:y:2018:i:c:p:44-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.07.028
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    Cited by:

    1. Pandher, Gurupdesh, 2022. "Determinants of Return-maximizing CEO Equity & Cash compensation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 154-168.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multidivisional firms; Spillovers; Collaboration; Divisional managers; Equity and profit incentives; M-form; Conglomerates;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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