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Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly

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  • Weitzman, Martin L.

Abstract

This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic “World Climate Assembly” that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal price (or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the proceeds from which are domestically retained. The other is to vote on the overall quantity of total worldwide emissions, which are then distributed for free (via a pre-decided fractional subdivision formula) as individual allowance permits that are subsequently marketed in an international cap-and-trade system. The model of the paper suggests that the majority-voted price is likely to be less distortionary and easier to enact than the majority-voted total quantity of permits. Some possible implications for climate-change negotiations are noted.

Suggested Citation

  • Weitzman, Martin L., 2017. "Voting on prices vs. voting on quantities in a World Climate Assembly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 199-211.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:71:y:2017:i:2:p:199-211
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2016.10.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Candelon, Bertrand & Hasse, Jean-Baptiste, 2023. "Testing for causality between climate policies and carbon emissions reduction," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(PA).
    2. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, 2023. "Debt, tax and environmental policy [Dette, taxe et politique environnementale]," Post-Print halshs-04181981, HAL.
    3. Barbara Annicchiarico & Stefano Carattini & Carolyn Fischer & Garth Heutel, 2022. "Business Cycles and Environmental Policy: A Primer," Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 221-253.
    4. Garth Heutel, 2018. "Bankable Prices," NBER Working Papers 25235, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Samin Shaaban-Nejad & Farid Shirazi, 2022. "ICT and Environmental Sustainability: A Comparative Study," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-24, July.
    6. Hammerle, Mara & Best, Rohan & Crosby, Paul, 2021. "Public acceptance of carbon taxes in Australia," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    7. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline, 2022. "Rendre acceptable la nécessaire taxation du carbone. Quelles pistes pour la France ?," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(1), pages 15-53.
    8. Jobst Heitzig & Sarah Hiller, 2020. "Degrees of individual and groupwise backward and forward responsibility in extensive-form games with ambiguity, and their application to social choice problems," Papers 2007.07352, arXiv.org.
    9. Matthew J. Kotchen, 2018. "Which Social Cost of Carbon? A Theoretical Perspective," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(3), pages 673-694.
    10. Luigi De Paoli, 2015. "The fight against climate change: some proposals for action for Italy in Europe," ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2015(1), pages 9-27.
    11. Martin L. Weitzman, 2017. "On a World Climate Assembly and the Social Cost of Carbon," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 559-586, October.
    12. Markus Schlott & Omar El Sayed & Mariia Bilousova & Fabian Hofmann & Alexander Kies & Horst Stocker, 2021. "Carbon Leakage in a European Power System with Inhomogeneous Carbon Prices," Papers 2105.05669, arXiv.org.
    13. Atalla, Tarek & Bigerna, Simona & Bollino, Carlo Andrea & Polinori, Paolo, 2018. "An alternative assessment of global climate policies," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1272-1289.
    14. Stefano Carattini & Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018. "Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(5), September.
    15. Stefano Carattini & Giseong Kim & Givi Melkadze & Aude Pommeret, 2023. "Carbon Taxes and Tariffs, Financial Frictions, and International Spillovers," CESifo Working Paper Series 10851, CESifo.
    16. Umit, Resul & Schaffer, Lena Maria, 2020. "Attitudes towards carbon taxes across Europe: The role of perceived uncertainty and self-interest," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    17. Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
    18. Christian Gollier and Jean Tirole, 2015. "Negotiating effective institutions against climate change," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Climate change; Global warming; International public goods; Prices vs. quantities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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