Who wants political integration?: Evidence from the Swedish EU-membership referendum
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- Vlachos, Jonas, 2003. "Who Wants Political Integration? Evidence from the Swedish EU-Membership Referendum," Working Paper Series 594, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Doyle, Orla & Fidrmuc, Jan, 2006. "Who favors enlargement?: Determinants of support for EU membership in the candidate countries' referenda," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 520-543, June.
- G Johnes, 2005. "Nations will fall? Revisiting the economic determinants of attitudes to European integration," Working Papers 566772, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
- Mwangi S. Kimenyi, 2006. "The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya," Working papers 2006-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Doyle, Orla & Fidrmuc, Jan, 2004.
"Who is in favor of enlargement? Determinants of support for EU membership in the candidate countries' referenda,"
ZEI Working Papers
B 04-2004, University of Bonn, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies.
- Orlagh Doyle & Jan Fidrmuc, 2005. "Who is in Favour of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate's Countries Referenda," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp045, IIIS.
- Fidrmuc, Jan & Doyle, Orla, 2004. "Who is in Favour of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for EU Membership in the Candidate Countries Referenda," CEPR Discussion Papers 4273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Pierre-Guillaume Meon, 2009.
"Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty,"
Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(18), pages 2369-2384.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2005. "Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty," DULBEA Working Papers 05-02.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2009. "Voting and turning out for monetary integration: the case of the French referendum on the Maastricht treaty," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/89993, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mariassunta Giannetti & Andrei Simonov, 2009.
"Social Interactions and Entrepreneurial Activity,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 665-709, September.
- Mariassunta Giannetti & Andrei Simonov, 2007. "Social Interactions and Entrepreneurial Activity," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lars Jonung, 2004. "The Political Economy of Monetary Unification: The Swedish Euro Referendum of 2003," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 24(1-2), pages 123-149, Spring/Su.
- Andrew Austin, 2005. "Provincial Interests and Political Integration: Voting in the French Maastricht Referendum," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp281, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
- Jonung, Lars, 2004.
"To be or not to be in the euro? Benefits and costs of monetary unification as perceived by voters in the Swedish euro referendum 2003,"
MPRA Paper
1334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lars Jonung, 2004. "To be or not to be in the euro? Benefits and costs of monetary unification as perceived by voters in the Swedish euro referendum 2003," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 205, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- repec:lan:wpaper:4385 is not listed on IDEAS
- Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2020.
"Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 185-205.
- Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2017. "Pocketbook Voting, Social Preferences, and Expressive Motives in Referenda," Discussion Papers in Economics 38425, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2017. "Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 312, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
- Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2020. "Pocketbook voting, social preferences, and expressive motives in referenda," Munich Reprints in Economics 84743, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Mwangi Kimenyi & William Shughart, 2010.
"The political economy of constitutional choice: a study of the 2005 Kenyan constitutional referendum,"
Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Mwangi S. Kimenyi & William F. Shughart II, 2008. "The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum," Working papers 2008-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- repec:lan:wpaper:4816 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:lan:wpaper:4512 is not listed on IDEAS
- Chun-Fang Chiang & Jin-Tan Liu & Tsai-Wei Wen, 2019.
"National identity under economic integration,"
Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 351-367, April.
- Chiang, Chun-Fang & Liu, Jin-Tan & Wen, Tsai-Wei, 2018. "National Identity under Economic Integration," GLO Discussion Paper Series 210, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Johannes Meya & Panu Poutvaara & Robert Schwager, 2015.
"Pocketbook Voting and Social Preferences in Referenda,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
5267, CESifo.
- Meya, Johannes & Poutvaara, Panu & Schwager, Robert, 2015. "Pocketbook voting and social preferences in referenda," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113120, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- repec:lan:wpaper:4384 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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