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Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures

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  • Lake, James

Abstract

Data on campaign contributions of PACs (political action committees) in the US does not contain the PACs' issues of concern. Additionally, while recent US lobbying data details the issues of concern for an interest group, it does not detail the Congressional representatives lobbied by the interest group. Expanding the time-frame of earlier work, I confirm that PACs engaging in lobbying and campaign contributions account for the majority of such political money despite representing a small minority of all PACs. I show how this allows the construction of a novel dataset that decomposes representative-specific contributions across issues as well as issue-specific lobbying expenditures across representatives. This decomposition can qualitatively affect results regarding the relationship between political money and Congressional voting behavior on trade policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Lake, James, 2015. "Revisiting the link between PAC contributions and lobbying expenditures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 86-101.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:37:y:2015:i:c:p:86-101
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.11.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Fremeth & Brian Kelleher Richter & Brandon Schaufele, 2018. "Spillovers from regulating corporate campaign contributions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 244-265, December.
    2. Martin Gregor, 2016. "Tullock's Puzzle in Pay-and-Play Lobbying," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 368-389, November.
    3. Lake, James & Nie, Jun, 2023. "The 2020 US Presidential election and Trump’s wars on trade and health insurance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    4. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2020. "Strategic Compromise, Policy Bundling and Interest Group Power," IZA Discussion Papers 13924, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Lake, James & Millimet, Daniel L., 2016. "An empirical analysis of trade-related redistribution and the political viability of free trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 156-178.
    6. Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023. "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Romero, Jorge A., 2022. "Lobbying and political expenses: Complements or substitutes?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 558-575.
    8. Jieun Lee, 2024. "Foreign lobbying through domestic subsidiaries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 80-103, March.
    9. Saha, Amrita, 2019. "Trade policy & lobbying effectiveness: Theory and evidence for India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 165-192.
    10. Albuquerque, Rui & Lei, Zicheng & Rocholl, Jörg & Zhang, Chendi, 2020. "Citizens United vs. FEC and corporate political activism," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    11. Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018. "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 559-572.
    12. James Lake & Jun Nie, 2022. "The 2020 US Presidential Election and Trump's Trade War," CESifo Working Paper Series 9669, CESifo.
    13. Fabella, Vigile Marie, 2017. "Political-economic determinants of education reform: Evidence on interest groups and student outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 144-161.
    14. repec:smu:ecowpa:1405 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Omer Gokcekus & Sertac Sonan, 2017. "Political contributions and corruption in the United States," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(4), pages 360-372, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interest groups; Campaign finance; Contributions; Lobbying; Trade policy; Free Trade Agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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