IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/poleco/v20y2004i4p1001-1009.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Kang

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Kang, 2004. "Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1001-1009, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:4:p:1001-1009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176-2680(03)00100-9
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:bla:ecorec:v:58:y:1982:i:162:p:235-41 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    3. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June.
    4. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "Federalism as a Commitment to Reserving Market Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 83-92, Fall.
    5. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Government in transition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 385-410, April.
    7. Wong, Christine P. W., 1987. "Between plan and market: The role of the local sector in post-mao China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 385-398, September.
    8. Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-358, May.
    9. Levin, Mark & Satarov, Georgy, 2000. "Corruption and institutions in Russia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 113-132, March.
    10. McKinnon, Ronald I, 1992. "Spontaneous Order on the Road Back from Socialism: An Asian Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 31-36, May.
    11. Michael Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2003. "Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in Federations," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(2), pages 177-199, April.
    12. Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, 1996. "China's transition to markets: market-preserving federalism, chinese style," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(2), pages 149-185.
    13. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Koomin Kim, 2023. "How gubernatorial budgetary power and interest groups affect vertical fiscal imbalances in the US states: Focusing on fiscal centralization and decentralization," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 53-81, July.
    2. Zakharov, Nikita, 2019. "Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 39-61.
    3. Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Is Corruption an Efficient Grease?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 244-259, March.
    4. Liu, Qijun, 2007. "How to improve government performance?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 1198-1206, December.
    5. Maria Kravtsova & Aleksey Oshchepkov, 2019. "Market And Network Corruption," HSE Working papers WP BRP 209/EC/2019, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Fei Bao & Zhenzhi Zhao, 2022. "“Takeover” and “Activation” Effects of National Strategies for Industrial Relocation—Based on the Perspective of Marketisation of Land Elements," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-23, October.
    7. Dalgic, Engin & Long, Ngo Van, 2006. "Corrupt local governments as resource farmers: The helping hand and the grabbing hand," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 115-138, March.
    8. Dong, Zhiqiang & Wei, Xiahai & Zhang, Yongjing, 2016. "The allocation of entrepreneurial efforts in a rent-seeking society: Evidence from China," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 353-371.
    9. Zhang, Yi & Liu, Chun, 2021. "Religion and unproductive entrepreneurship: The role of risk aversion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    10. Fan, Xin & Qiu, Sainan & Sun, Yukun, 2020. "Land finance dependence and urban land marketization in China: The perspective of strategic choice of local governments on land transfer," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    11. Birney, Mayling, 2014. "Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates”," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 55-67.
    12. Neyapti, Bilin, 2010. "Fiscal decentralization and deficits: International evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 155-166, June.
    13. Lin-Feng Yue & Jing-Ran Sun & Long-Jian Yang, 2022. "The impact of fiscal centralization policies on education expenditure among Chinese local governments," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 2281-2300, August.
    14. Huang, Bihong & Chen, Kang, 2012. "Are intergovernmental transfers in China equalizing?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 534-551.
    15. repec:elg:eechap:15325_22 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Shenghui Tong, 2022. "Corruption and anti‐corruption in China: a review and future research agenda," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 36(1), pages 3-16, May.
    17. Zhang, Xiaoheng & Yu, Xiaohua & You, Liangzhi, 2020. "Does the Granary County Subsidy Program Lead to manipulation of grain production data in China?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    18. Kahana, Nava & Qijun, Liu, 2010. "Endemic corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 82-88, March.
    19. Alfred M Wu, 2019. "The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(12), pages 1-15, December.
    20. Diaby, Aboubacar & Sylwester, Kevin, 2014. "Bureaucratic competition and public corruption: Evidence from transition countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 75-87.
    21. Lotta Moberg & Vlad Tarko, 2021. "Special economic zones and liberalization avalanches," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 120-139, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jin, Hehui & Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R., 2005. "Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1719-1742, September.
    2. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    3. Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2001. "Federalism With and Without Political Centralization: China Versus Russia," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(4), pages 1-8.
    4. Yingyi Qian, 1999. "The Institutional Foundations of China's Market Transition," Working Papers 99011, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    5. Evgeny Yakovlev & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2007. "Deregulation of Business," Working Papers w0097, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    6. Cull, Robert & Xu, Lixin Colin & Yang, Xi & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Tian, 2017. "Market facilitation by local government and firm efficiency: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 460-480.
    7. Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A. & Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2006. "Federal tax autonomy and the limits of cooperation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 317-329, March.
    8. Scott Gehlbach, 2003. "Taxability and Low-Productivity Traps," Working Papers w0029, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    9. Yang, Xiaoliang & Barros, Lucy & Matthews, Kent & Meenagh, David, 2024. "The dynamics of redistribution, inequality and growth across China’s regions," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 613-637.
    10. Sonin, Konstantin, 2010. "Provincial protectionism," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 111-122, June.
    11. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    12. Xiaodong Chen & Haoming Mi & Peng Zhou, 2024. "Whether to decentralize and how to decentralize? The optimal fiscal federalism in an endogenous growth model," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(29), pages 3499-3516, June.
    13. Mengting Ruan & Xiaolu Zhao, 2022. "Fiscal Pressure, Policy Choices and Regional Economic Disparity: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(19), pages 1-13, September.
    14. Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V., 2000. "Incentives to provide local public goods: fiscal federalism, Russian style," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 337-368, June.
    15. Bo, Shiyu, 2020. "Centralization and regional development: Evidence from a political hierarchy reform to create cities in china," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    16. Han, Li & Kung, James Kai-Sing, 2015. "Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 89-104.
    17. Nan Jia & Kyle J. Mayer, 2017. "Political hazards and firms' geographic concentration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 203-231, February.
    18. Alexeev, Michael & Kurlyandskaya, Galina, 2003. "Fiscal federalism and incentives in a Russian region," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 20-33, March.
    19. Stefan Brehm & Jesper Svensson, 2017. "A fragmented environmental state? Analysing spatial compliance patterns for the case of transparency legislation in China," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 471-493, October.
    20. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:4:p:1001-1009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.