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The British utility regulation model: Its recent history and future prospects

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  • Stern, Jon

Abstract

This paper considers the evolution of the British model of independent utility regulation from the publication of the 1983 Littlechild Report on telecom regulation. Over the last ten years, the model has faced some threats to its pro-competition emphasis, notably in energy regulation and particularly in electricity. These threats have arisen since 2008 and the onset of the Great Recession. However, with the partial exception of energy, challenges to the independence of regulators and to the role of competition have not been acute. The model seems to have generally been able successfully to meet the challenges faced and, relative to other countries, remains intact, if less distinctive. The main continuing issue is how best to handle repeat price-setting regulatory reviews where new initiatives have been tried but have not as yet reached a settled framework within which to handle the underlying strategic gaming problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Stern, Jon, 2014. "The British utility regulation model: Its recent history and future prospects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 162-172.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:31:y:2014:i:c:p:162-172
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2014.09.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bolt, Chris, 2014. "UK experience of utility regulation since 2003 and outlook," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 173-177.
    2. Binmore, Ken, 2007. "Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199218462, Decembrie.
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    4. Armstrong, Mark & Sappington, David E.M., 2007. "Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1557-1700, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tooraj Jamasb and Manuel Llorca, 2019. "Energy Systems Integration: Economics of a New Paradigm," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    2. Alena V. Pivavarava & Christel Koop, 2023. "The adoption of digital practices by economic regulators: mapping digital pathways for consumer e-participation," Economics Series Working Papers 1013, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Inderst, Georg, 2017. "UK Infrastructure Investment and Finance from a European and Global Perspective," MPRA Paper 79621, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Johnstone, David & Havyatt, David, 2022. "Sophistry and high electricity prices in Australia," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    5. Bruno, Giuseppe & Cavola, Manuel & Diglio, Antonio & Piccolo, Carmela & Pipicelli, Eduardo, 2021. "Strategies to reduce postal network access points: from demographic to spatial distribution criteria," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    6. Lodge, Martin & Stern, Jon, 2014. "British utility regulation: Consolidation, existential angst, or fiasco?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 146-151.
    7. Robert Hahn & Robert Metcalfe & Florian Rundhammer, 2020. "Promoting customer engagement: A new trend in utility regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 14(1), pages 121-149, January.
    8. Biggar, Darryl, 2022. "Seven outstanding issues in energy network regulation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    9. Colin Turner, 2018. "The governance of polycentric national infrastructure systems: Evidence from the UK National Infrastructure Plan," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 36(3), pages 513-529, May.
    10. Warren, Liz & Seal, Will, 2018. "Using investment appraisal models in strategic negotiation: The cultural political economy of electricity generation," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 16-32.
    11. Mirrlees-Black, Jonathan, 2014. "Reflections on RPI-X regulation in OECD countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 197-202.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive regulation; Competition and regulation; Strategic gaming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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