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Electoral motives, constituency systems, ideologies, and a free trade agreement: The case of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations

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  • Kagitani, Koichi
  • Harimaya, Kozo

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between candidates and voters in the dispute over a free trade agreement. We theoretically show that candidates’ electoral promises about a free trade agreement are related to the economic interests of their districts, the types of constituency systems under which they compete with one another, and their ideologies. We empirically confirm the theoretical expectations, using as a case study the 2012 general election in Japan, where whether to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) talks was one of the biggest issues. The TPP tends to be opposed by voters working in the agricultural sector and those living in districts with a larger amount of cultivated land, whereas it tends to be supported by college-educated voters and those living in districts with more export manufacturers. Accordingly, candidates tend to oppose (support) the TPP when their districts have a larger stake in agriculture (export manufacturers) and a smaller (larger) number of college-educated voters. Further, proportional representation candidates are more supportive of the TPP; likewise, candidates and voters who prefer a small government and who emphasize the Japan–United States relationship tend to support the TPP.

Suggested Citation

  • Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2017. "Electoral motives, constituency systems, ideologies, and a free trade agreement: The case of Japan joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 51-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jjieco:v:45:y:2017:i:c:p:51-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2017.07.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Banri Ito, 2021. "Trade exposure and electoral protectionism: evidence from Japanese politician-level data," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 157(1), pages 181-205, February.
    2. Tomiura, Eiichi & Ito, Banri & Mukunoki, Hiroshi & Wakasugi, Ryuhei, 2021. "Individual characteristics and the demand for reciprocity in trade liberalization: Evidence from a survey in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C).
    3. Kinari, Yusuke & Ohtake, Fumio & Kimball, Miles & Morimoto, Shoko & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 2019. "Happiness before and after an election: An analysis based on a daily survey around Japan’s 2009 election," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 187-194.
    4. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2020. "Does international trade competition influence candidates and voters? The case of Japanese Lower House elections," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    5. Koichi Kagitani & Kozo Harimaya, 2020. "Constituency systems, election proximity, special interests and a free trade agreement: the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Japan," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 897-922, October.
    6. Sakuyama, T., 2018. "Electoral rules and agricultural protectionism: The case of Japan s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277151, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    7. Akihito Asano & Michiru Sakane, 2023. "The welfare effects of partial tariff reduction in Japan," Working Papers e177, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    8. Kagitani, Koichi & Harimaya, Kozo, 2019. "Electoral rules and free trade agreements as a campaign issue: The case of political disputes over the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 126-137.
    9. Wickes, Ron, 2021. "Trade deficits and trade conflict: The United States and Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Free trade agreement; Political economy; Electoral competition; Electoral system; Japan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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