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Do labor markets discipline? Evidence from RMBS bankers

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  • Griffin, John M.
  • Kruger, Samuel
  • Maturana, Gonzalo

Abstract

This paper examines whether employees involved in residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) securitization experienced internal and external labor market consequences relative to similar non-RMBS employees in the same banks and why. Senior RMBS bankers experienced similar levels of job retention, promotion, and external job opportunities. Even signers of RMBS deals with high loss and misreporting rates or deals implicated in lawsuits experienced no adverse internal or external labor market outcomes. These findings are likely not explained by targeted or delayed employee discipline, small legal fines, or protection due to pending litigation but are consistent with implicit upper-management approval of RMBS activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Griffin, John M. & Kruger, Samuel & Maturana, Gonzalo, 2019. "Do labor markets discipline? Evidence from RMBS bankers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(3), pages 726-750.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:133:y:2019:i:3:p:726-750
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.005
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    Cited by:

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    2. Aiello, Darren J., 2022. "Financially constrained mortgage servicers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 590-610.
    3. Bunkanwanicha, Pramuan & Di Giuli, Alberta & Salvade, Federica, 2022. "Bank CEO careers after bailouts: The effects of management turnover on bank risk," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    4. Samuel Kruger & Gonzalo Maturana, 2021. "Collateral Misreporting in the Residential Mortgage-Backed Security Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(5), pages 2729-2750, May.
    5. Whited, Toni M, 2019. "JFE special issue on labor and finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(3), pages 539-540.
    6. John M. Griffin & Samuel Kruger & Prateek Mahajan, 2023. "Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(3), pages 1777-1827, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    RMBS fraud; Labor market discipline; Financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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