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Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

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  • Adelino, Manuel
  • Dinc, I. Serdar

Abstract

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms’ investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm׳s lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Adelino, Manuel & Dinc, I. Serdar, 2014. "Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 256-272.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:114:y:2014:i:2:p:256-272
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.07.004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Distress; Lobbying; Stimulus; Financial crisis; Political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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