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A model of endogenous quality management

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  • George, Donald A. R.

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  • George, Donald A. R., 2000. "A model of endogenous quality management," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 289-304.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:52:y:2000:i:3:p:289-304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Matthews, Steven & Moore, John, 1987. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 441-467, March.
    2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    7. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    8. Walter Y. Oi, 1973. "The Economics of Product Safety," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(1), pages 3-28, Spring.
    9. Geoffrey Heal, 1977. "Guarantees and Risk-Sharing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 549-560.
    10. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    11. James E. McClure & Lee C. Spector, 1991. "Joint Product Signals of Product Quality," Working Papers 199101, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 1991.
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