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You should reject this paper: Dynamic agency, sequential evaluation, and learning in academic publishing

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  • Lawson, Nicholas

Abstract

A variety of real-world situations take the form of repeated principal-agent problems with binary evaluation. I evaluate the principal's optimal evaluation effort and quality threshold for acceptance in the setting of dynamic agency with binary evaluation, focusing specifically on the evaluation by a top academic journal of papers submitted by economists. In the baseline model, the journal should statistically discriminate in favour of high-status economists, by setting an acceptance threshold that declines with their prior estimate of the economist's quality, while evaluation effort should likely increase with perceived author quality, as this provides incentives for authors to exert more effort, which is particularly valuable from the highest-quality authors. However, if a first good publication is more valuable than subsequent publications by the same economist, acceptance thresholds will tend to increase after publication success, relative to the threshold that would have followed a rejection.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawson, Nicholas, 2024. "You should reject this paper: Dynamic agency, sequential evaluation, and learning in academic publishing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 112-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:217:y:2024:i:c:p:112-140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.11.009
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential evaluation; Learning; Dynamic agency; Academic publishing; Binary evaluation; Statistical discrimination;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J79 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Other

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