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The rise and fall of communal liability in ancient law

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  • Parisi, Francesco
  • Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe

Abstract

In ancient societies, rules of communal responsibility permitted the imposition of retaliatory sanctions on a wrongdoer’s clan. These rules followed the collective ownership structure of early communities. Over time, notions of personal responsibility emerged, terminating the transfer of responsibility from one member to the whole clan. This paper intends to provide an economic explanation for this transition.
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  • Parisi, Francesco & Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, 2004. "The rise and fall of communal liability in ancient law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 489-505, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:489-505
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Larcom Shaun & Swanson Timothy, 2015. "Documenting Legal Dissonance: Legal Pluralism in Papua New Guinea," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 25-50, March.
    2. Schaefer Hans-Bernd, 2020. "Laudatio: Francesco Parisi," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, March.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2007. "Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 81-106, January.
    4. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, 2005. "The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 207-237, January.
    5. Thomas J. Miceli, 2013. "Collective Responsibility," Working papers 2013-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    6. Thomas J. Miceli, 2018. "On proportionality of punishments and the economic theory of crime," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 303-314, December.
    7. Zdybel, Karol B., 2024. "Norms among heterogeneous agents: a rational-choice model," ILE Working Paper Series 78, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    8. Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Counting offenders’ gains? Economic and moral considerations in the determination of criminality," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 475-496, December.
    9. Coşgel, Metin & Miceli, Thomas J., 2018. "The price of redemption: Sin, penance, and marginal deterrence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 206-218.
    10. Parisi Francesco, 2020. "Law and Economics as We Grow Younger," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-20, March.
    11. Naso, Pedro & Bulte, Erwin & Swanson, Tim, 2020. "Legal pluralism in post-conflict Sierra Leone," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    12. Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Crime as exchange: comparing alternative economic theories of criminal justice," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 523-539, June.
    13. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.

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