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The effect of the split share structure reform on working capital management of Chinese companies

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  • He, Wei
  • Mukherjee, Tarun K.
  • Kent Baker, H.

Abstract

Before the introduction of the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR) of 2005, a dual stock system characterized Chinese-listed firms. The states owned non-tradable shares and private owners held tradable shares. The dual system generated agency problems because state owners enjoyed all the rights reserved for tradable shares but escaped the stock market risk faced by non-state shareholders. Because executives of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) received rewards based on the book value of assets rather than the market price of shares, they had no incentive to maximize the share price. The SSSR led to the conversion of non-tradable shares to tradable shares, with two major implications: (1) the interests of government and private owners are now more closely aligned and (2) government agents of SOEs are now rewarded and punished based on a firm's market performance. Thus, the expectation is that government agents turn their attention to improving a firm's market performance rather than its book value during the post-reform era. We examine the impact of the SSSR on Chinese firms' investments in working capital. Based on 511 manufacturing firms between 2003 and 2011, we find that the SSSR is associated with significant reductions in working capital investments during the post-reform period. The reduced investment in working capital is associated with improved market performance of these firms.

Suggested Citation

  • He, Wei & Mukherjee, Tarun K. & Kent Baker, H., 2017. "The effect of the split share structure reform on working capital management of Chinese companies," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 27-37.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:27-37
    DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2017.02.003
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    6. Daniliuc, Sorin & Guo, Hui & Wee, Marvin, 2023. "The usefulness of financial advisors to government-influenced Chinese acquirers," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    7. Grzegorz Zimon & Vitalina Babenko & Beata Sadowska & Katarzyna Chudy-Laskowska & Blanka Gosik, 2021. "Inventory Management in SMEs Operating in Polish Group Purchasing Organizations during the COVID-19 Pandemic," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-16, April.
    8. Grzegorz Zimon & Dominik Zimon, 2020. "Quality Management Systems and Working Capital SMEs in GPO—A Case of Poland," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-13, October.
    9. Xiaohong Xian & Xiang Zhang & Zongyi Zhang & Stavros Sindakis & Sakshi Aggarwal, 2024. "Cash Holdings Trends Influenced by Market Competitiveness: Evidence from the Chinese Stock Market," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(2), pages 8767-8796, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Split share structure reform; Working capital management; Cash conversion cycle; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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