Attacking a nuclear facility: The impact of a noisy intelligence with unknown quality
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DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.006
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Keywords
Nuclear deterrence; Intelligence system; Perfect Bayesian equilibrium;All these keywords.
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