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Towards a politico-economic theory of social security

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  • van Velthoven, Ben
  • van Winden, Frans

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  • van Velthoven, Ben & van Winden, Frans, 1985. "Towards a politico-economic theory of social security," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 263-289, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:27:y:1985:i:2:p:263-289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Jessop, Bob, 1977. "Recent Theories of the Capitalist State," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 1(4), pages 353-373, December.
    3. Foley, Duncan K., 1978. "State expenditure from a Marxist perspective," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 221-238, April.
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. repec:bla:kyklos:v:27:y:1974:i:2:p:227-54 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Davis, Otto A. & Dempster, M. A. H. & Wildavsky, Aaron, 1966. "A Theory of the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 529-547, September.
    7. Hu, Sheng Cheng, 1982. "Social Security, Majority-Voting Equilibrium and Dynamic Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 269-287, June.
    8. Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
    9. van Velthoven, Ben & van Winden, Frans, 1984. "Social classes and state behavior : An illustrative application to the U.S. economy of the interest function approach to politico-economic modelling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 113-118.
    10. Albert Breton, 1974. "The economic theory of representative government: A reply," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 129-133, December.
    11. Van Winden, Francesco A A M, 1980. "The Interaction between State and Firms," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 428-452, November.
    12. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-388, September.
    13. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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