IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecoedu/v30y2011i6p1416-1429.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment

Author

Listed:
  • De Paola, Maria
  • Scoppa, Vincenzo

Abstract

We carry out a randomized experiment involving undergraduate students enrolled at an Italian University attending two introductory economics classes to evaluate the impact on achievement of examination frequency and interim feedback provision. Students in the treated group were allowed to undertake an intermediate exam and were informed about the results obtained, while students in the control group could only take the final exam. The results show that students undertaking the intermediate exam perform better both in terms of the probability of passing the exams and of grades obtained. High ability students appear to benefit more from the treatment. The experiment design allows us to disentangle “workload division or commitment” effects from “feedback provision” effects. We find that the estimated treatment impact is due exclusively to the first effect, while the feedback provision has no positive effect on performance. Finally, the better performance of treated students in targeted examinations seems not to be obtained at the expenses of results earned in other examinations.

Suggested Citation

  • De Paola, Maria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2011. "Frequency of examinations and student achievement in a randomized experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1416-1429.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:1416-1429
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.07.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775711001129
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.07.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or

    for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Azmat, Ghazala & Iriberri, Nagore, 2010. "The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(7-8), pages 435-452, August.
    2. Schwerdt, Guido & Wuppermann, Amelie C., 2011. "Is traditional teaching really all that bad? A within-student between-subject approach," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 365-379, April.
    3. Duflo, Esther & Glennerster, Rachel & Kremer, Michael, 2008. "Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 61, pages 3895-3962, Elsevier.
    4. Freeman, Richard Barry & Gelber, Alexander M., 2010. "Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence," Scholarly Articles 34310817, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    5. Burger, Nicholas & Charness, Gary & Lynham, John, 2011. "Field and online experiments on self-control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 393-404, March.
    6. Joshua Angrist & Victor Lavy, 2009. "The Effects of High Stakes High School Achievement Awards: Evidence from a Randomized Trial," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1384-1414, September.
    7. Richard B. Freeman & Alexander M. Gelber, 2010. "Prize Structure and Information in Tournaments: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 149-164, January.
    8. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Contests with multiple rounds," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 213-227, April.
    9. Howard S. Bloom, 1984. "Accounting for No-Shows in Experimental Evaluation Designs," Evaluation Review, , vol. 8(2), pages 225-246, April.
    10. Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 679-688, December.
    11. Florian Ederer, 2010. "Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 733-769, September.
    12. Alessandro Lizzeri & Margaret A. Meyer & Nicola Persico, 2002. "The Incentive Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations," Penn CARESS Working Papers 592e9328faf6e775bf331e1c0, Penn Economics Department.
    13. Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8769.
    14. Schacter, John & Thum, Yeow Meng, 2004. "Paying for high- and low-quality teaching," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 411-430, August.
    15. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
    16. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010. "Information feedback in a dynamic tournament," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 242-260, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marianne Bernatzky & Jos Mar a Cabrera & Alejandro Cid, 2017. "Frequency of testing Lessons from a field experiment in higher education," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1703, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
    2. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2019. "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 74-90.
    3. Damgaard, Mette Trier & Nielsen, Helena Skyt, 2018. "Nudging in education," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 313-342.
    4. Belayet Hossain & Panagiotis Tsigaris, 2015. "Are grade expectations rational? A classroom experiment," Education Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 199-212, April.
    5. Antonello E. Scorcu & Laura Vici, 2013. "Economic and cultural factors and illegal copying in the university textbook market," ACEI Working Paper Series AWP-01-2013, Association for Cultural Economics International, revised Feb 2013.
    6. Damgaard, Mette Trier, 2021. "A decade of nudging: What have we learned?," Nationaløkonomisk tidsskrift, Nationaløkonomisk Forening, vol. 2021(1), pages 1-21.
    7. Nicholas A. Wright & Puneet Arora & Jesse Wright, 2024. "I Promise to Work Hard: The Impact of a Non-Binding Commitment Pledge on Academic Performance," Working Papers 2411, Florida International University, Department of Economics.
    8. Onji, Kazuki, 2013. "Estimating the effects of procrastination on performance: A small sample study," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-90.
    9. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2015. "Are females scared of competing with males? Results from a field experiment," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 117-128.
    10. Kooreman, Peter, 2013. "Rational students and resit exams," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 213-215.
    11. Gianluca Argentin & Aline Pennisi & Daniele Vidoni & Giovanni Abbiati & Andrea Caputo, 2014. "Trying to Raise (Low) Math Achievement and to Promote (Rigorous) Policy Evaluation in Italy: Evidence From a Large-Scale Randomized Trial," Evaluation Review, , vol. 38(2), pages 99-132, April.
    12. De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2018. "The adverse consequences of tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 1-18.
    13. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2017. "Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Discussion Papers 36, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    14. De Paola, Maria & Lombardo, Rosetta & Pupo, Valeria & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2021. "Do Women Shy Away from Public Speaking? A Field Experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    15. Mette T. Damgaard, 2020. "A decade of nudging: What have we learned?," Economics Working Papers 2020-07, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    16. Kooreman, Peter, 2012. "Rational Students and Resit Exams," IZA Discussion Papers 6832, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Bratti, Massimiliano & Granato, Silvia & Havari, Enkelejda, 2024. "Another Chance: Number of Exam Retakes and University Students' Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 17400, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2020. "Information feedback in relative grading: Evidence from a field experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    19. Aina, Carmen & Aktaş, Koray & Casalone, Giorgia, 2024. "Effects of workload allocation per course on students’ academic outcomes: Evidence from STEM degrees," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gwen-Jiro Clochard & Guillaume Hollard & Julia Wirtz, 2022. "More effort or better technologies? On the effect of relative performance feedback," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 22/767, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2020. "Information feedback in relative grading: Evidence from a field experiment," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-19, April.
    3. Shinya Kajitani & Keiichi Morimoto & Shiba Suzuki, 2017. "Relative Performance Information Feedback and Just-Pass Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Discussion Papers 36, Meisei University, School of Economics.
    4. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur & Arjan Non & Willem Verbeke, 2015. "The Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 521-569.
    5. List, John A. & Rasul, Imran, 2011. "Field Experiments in Labor Economics," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 2, pages 103-228, Elsevier.
    6. Bin R. Chen & Y. Stephen Chiu, 2013. "Interim Performance Evaluation in Contract Design," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 665-698, June.
    7. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    8. repec:cep:stieop:46 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Benoît S. Y. Crutzen & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2013. "Confidence Management: On Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 744-767, December.
    10. Azmat, Ghazala & Iriberri, Nagore, 2010. "The importance of relative performance feedback information: Evidence from a natural experiment using high school students," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(7-8), pages 435-452, August.
    11. Ashraf, Nava & Bandiera, Oriana & Lee, Scott S., 2014. "Awards unbundled: Evidence from a natural field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 44-63.
    12. Banuri, Sheheryar & Danková, Katarína & Keefer, Philip, 2024. "An experimental test of gaming incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 825-850.
    13. Migheli, Matteo, 2019. "Competing for promotion: Are “THE BEST” always the best?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 149-161.
    14. Julie Rosaz, 2012. "Biased Information And Effort," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 484-501, April.
    15. David Gill & Zdenka Kissová & Jaesun Lee & Victoria Prowse, 2019. "First-Place Loving and Last-Place Loathing: How Rank in the Distribution of Performance Affects Effort Provision," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(2), pages 494-507, February.
    16. Julia Nafziger & Heiner Schumacher, 2013. "Information Management and Incentives," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 140-163, March.
    17. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2010. "Information feedback in a dynamic tournament," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 242-260, November.
    18. Daniel P. Gross, 2017. "Performance feedback in competitive product development," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(2), pages 438-466, May.
    19. Ertac, Seda & Koçkesen, Levent & Ozdemir, Duygu, 2016. "The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback: Theory and experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 24-45.
    20. Bandiera, Oriana & Larcinese, Valentino & Rasul, Imran, 2015. "Blissful ignorance? A natural experiment on the effect of feedback on students' performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 13-25.
    21. Maria Goltsman & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Interim Performance Feedback in Multistage Tournaments: The Optimality of Partial Disclosure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 229-265.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecoedu:v:30:y:2011:i:6:p:1416-1429. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/econedurev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.