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Corporate Governance, Board Characteristics and Performance of Indian Banks: An Empirical Study

Author

Listed:
  • Brahmaiah Bezawada

    (Department of Finance, ICFAI Business School (IBS), IFHE, Hyderabad, India.)

  • Sager Reddy Adaelli

    (Department of Finance, ICFAI Business School (IBS), IFHE, Hyderabad, India.)

Abstract

The paper examines the corporate governance, board characteristics, performance and asset quality of Indian banks and investigates the impact of a set of board characteristics on performance and asset quality of banks. We use a sample of 34 scheduled commercial banks, for ten years from 2009 to 2018, accounting for about 90 per cent of the total banking assets and banking business India. We measure bank performance by return on assets (ROA) and asset quality of banks by ratio of net non-performing assets (NNPA) and document evidence on the role of the board characteristics on performance and asset quality of banks. The study finds that the board size and percentage of independent directors have significantly positive impact on ROA. The percentage of executive directors is having significantly negative relationship with the ROA. The board size and percentage of independent directors have significantly negative relationship with banks' NNPAs. The research suggests that the board of directors play a significant role in bank governance in India. The paper contributes to the literature on the corporate governance of banks in India, which is one of the emerging economies of the world. The research results provide some insights of corporate governance to the RBI for considering appropriate policy guidelines on corporate governance to banking industry in India.

Suggested Citation

  • Brahmaiah Bezawada & Sager Reddy Adaelli, 2020. "Corporate Governance, Board Characteristics and Performance of Indian Banks: An Empirical Study," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 10(3), pages 83-87.
  • Handle: RePEc:eco:journ1:2020-03-11
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Board characteristics; Performance of banks; Non-performing assets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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