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An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence

Author

Listed:
  • Kim Gannon

    (Yale School of Public Health)

  • Hanzhe Zhang

    (Department of Economics, Michigan State University)

Abstract

This paper provides an evolutionary justification for overconfidence. Players are pairwise matched to compete for a resource, and there is uncertainty about who will win the resource if they choose to compete. Players have different confidence levels about their chance of winning, although in reality they have the same chance of winning. Each player may or may not know her opponent's confidence level. We characterize the evolutionarily stable equilibrium, represented by players' strategies and distribution of confidence levels. Under different informational environments, a majority of players are overconfident---i.e. they overestimate their chance of winning. We also characterize the evolutionary dynamics and the rate of convergence to the equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Gannon & Hanzhe Zhang, 2020. "An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2494-2504.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-20-00315
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020. "Preference Evolution in Different Marriage Markets," Working Papers 2020-1, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Wu, Jiabin & Zhang, Hanzhe, 2021. "Preference evolution in different matching markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    overconfidence; evolutionary game;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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