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Education as advertisement

Author

Listed:
  • Junichiro Ishida

    (Shinshu University)

Abstract

The paper perceives education as a type of money burning activity, much like advertisement, and examines its effect on social welfare. In a model where the employer's job assignment also functions as a signal a la Waldman (1984), there exists a separating equilibrium in which education credibly conveys information even when the single-crossing property fails to hold. Moreover, we also show that education as advertisement can actually be welfare-improving. This result indicates that education can be meaningful and even socially desirable even if its sole role is simply to waste resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Junichiro Ishida, 2004. "Education as advertisement," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(8), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-04j00002
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2004/Volume10/EB-04J00002A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    2. John G. Riley, 2001. "Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 432-478, June.
    3. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-450, June.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. Ishida, Junichiro, 2004. "Signaling and strategically delayed promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 687-700, December.
    6. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
    7. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    8. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-519, July.
    9. Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
    10. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
    2. Wei-Bin ZHANG, 2014. "Human Capital, Wealth, and Renewable Resources," Expert Journal of Economics, Sprint Investify, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20.
    3. Zhang Wei-Bin, 2012. "Education and Human Capital Accumulation in a Two -Sector Growth Model with Elastic Labor Supply," Scientific Annals of Economics and Business, Sciendo, vol. 59(1), pages 289-309, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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