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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

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  • Chaigneau, Pierre
  • Sahuguet, Nicolas

Abstract

We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:53:y:2018:i:03:p:1297-1339_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    3. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Davide Castellani & Fabio Pieri, 2022. "CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 361-382, June.
    4. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Hu, Gang & Li, Yingzhen & Xie, Jing, 2021. "Institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.

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