Author
Abstract
The transition from hyperglobalization to slowgbalization that began after the 2008 global financial crisis has increased skepticism about the future of globalization and motivation to adjust the architecture of international trade. The subsequent series of global shocks – the aggravation of the US-Chinese trade relations, the COVID-19 pandemic, the events in Ukraine in 2022-2023 – aggravated the situation, exacerbating the problem of stopping the negative consequences of the disruption of supply chains of goods and services. The purpose of the article is to clarify the contours of restructuring and outlooks for the development of cross-border trade in the context of new reality: the imposition of global shocks, increasing geopolitical uncertainty and increasing fragmentation of the world economy. The object of the study is the international trade in the perimeter of global value chains (GVCs), whose share in world trade increased from 34.93% in 1995 to 45.24% in 2007 and, after falling to 43.49% in 2020, quickly recovered and increased to 49.38% in 2022. The analysis of quantitative and structural shifts in GVC-trade was based on the methodology of structuring exports in the categories of value added by A. Borin and M. Mancini. The prospects for GVC-trade were assessed using the methods of identifying the “risk iness†of goods in the export-import turnover of S. Majune and V. Stolzenburg, the frequency of cross-border bilateral interactions of S. Liang, the agglomeration to global trade of K. Baris. The characteristics of the four main options for strengthening the resistance of GVCs in modern conditions are given – reshoring, diversification, regionalization and replication. The working hypothesis has been confirmed: all 4 considered trajectories are not mutually exclusive and none of them presupposes complete autarky of the country. The main conclusion is made, according to which the negative events in the global economy of the last decade reconfigured trade flows, accelerated the processes of regionalization of the global economy, but did not become a trigger for deglobalization.
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ccs:journl:y:2024:id:1464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Кривопалов Ð Ð»ÐµÐºÑ ÐµÐ¹ Ð Ð»ÐµÐºÑ ÐµÐµÐ²Ð¸Ñ‡ (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.