La crise financière : enseignements et perspectives

The causes of the major financial crisis that surfaced in 2007 are identical to those of virtually all crises that have occurred since the beginning of the 19th century ? a credit and debt crisis, a speculative asset bubble (in this case real estate) and a liquidity crisis ? but the latest crisis had the particular feature of being significantly accentuated by a new element, namely unbridled securitisation. A phenomenon which at the same time facilitated higher indebtedness and considerably intensified the liquidity crisis. Macroeconomically, it was a crisis of overproduction and overindebtedness caused by poorly regulated globalisation. The eurozone crisis, which began in 2010, is not simply a consequence of the financial crisis that preceded it. It is essentially the result of having constructed an incomplete monetary zone. Convergence criteria prevented neither a profound divergence in current account balances between the countries of the north and those of the south, nor a growing industrial polarisation. Symetrically, the hopes of subsequent deeper federalism within the zone were dashed. How can we avoid the pitfalls of illusory federalism and of a return to convergence criteria via policies of internal devaluation which may increase the political and social risk within the eurozone itself, potentially undermining its very existence? Classification JEL: F36, F55, G01.