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A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card Payments?

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  • Hayashi Fumiko

    (Payments System Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City)

Abstract

This paper presents models that explain why merchants accept payment cards even when the fees they face exceed the transactional benefits they receive from a card transaction. The prevalent assumption - merchants accept cards only when they earn positive net transactional benefits - holds only for a monopoly merchant who faces an inelastic consumer demand. The paper also explores possible explanations for the recent gradual increases in merchant fees in the United States. Three possible explanations are 1) inflexible product price setting by merchants, 2) decreases (increases) in cardholder fees (rebates), and 3) increases in cardholding-customer proportion in a given industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Hayashi Fumiko, 2006. "A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Merchants Still Accepting Card Payments?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-31, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:5:y:2006:i:1:n:9
    DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1093
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, 2007. "Competing Payment Schemes," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 37-67, March.
    2. repec:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:2:p:103-22 is not listed on IDEAS
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    13. Fumiko Hayashi & Richard J. Sullivan & Stuart E. Weiner, 2006. "A guide to the ATM and debit card industry - 2006 update," Monograph, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, number 2006agttaadci2, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jonker Nicole, 2011. "Card Acceptance and Surcharging: the Role of Costs and Competition," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-35, June.
    2. Krivosheya, Egor & Korolev, Andrew, 2018. "Benefits of the retail payments card market: Evidence from Russian merchants," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 466-473.
    3. Fumiko Hayashi, 2008. "The economics of payment card fee structure: what is the optimal balance between merchant fee and payment card rewards?," Research Working Paper RWP 08-06, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    4. Fumiko Hayashi, 2008. "The economics of payment card fee structure: policy considerations of payment card rewards," Research Working Paper RWP 08-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    5. Christian Jaag & Christian Bach, 2014. "The Effect of Payment Reversibility on E-commerce and Postal Quality," Working Papers 0046, Swiss Economics.
    6. Fumiko Hayashi & Stuart E. Weiner, 2006. "Interchange fees in Australia, the UK, and the United States : matching theory and practice," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 91(Q III), pages 75-112.
    7. Zhu Wang, 2010. "Regulating debit cards: the case of ad valorem fees," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 95(Q I), pages 71-93.
    8. Fumiko Hayashi & Stuart E. Weiner, 2005. "Competition and credit and debit card interchange fees: a cross-country analysis," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 05-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    9. James J. McAndrews & Zhu Wang, 2008. "The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage," Research Working Paper RWP 08-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    10. Nicholas Economides & David Henriques, 2011. "To Surcharge or Not To Surcharge? A Two-Sided Market Perspective of the No-Surcharge Rule," Working Papers 11-03, NET Institute.
    11. Weiner Stuart E. & Wright Julian, 2005. "Interchange Fees in Various Countries: Developments and Determinants," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(4), pages 1-34, December.
    12. Chakravorti, Sujit & To, Ted, 2007. "A theory of credit cards," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 583-595, June.
    13. Wang, Zhu, 2010. "Market structure and payment card pricing: What drives the interchange?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 86-98, January.
    14. Fumiko Hayashi, 2009. "Do U.S. consumers really benefit from payment card rewards?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 94(Q I), pages 37-63.
    15. Fumiko Hayashi, 2006. "Pricing and welfare implications of payment card network competition," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 06-03, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    16. Ron Borzekowski & Elizabeth K. Kiser & Mark D. Manuszak & Robin A. Prager, 2009. "Interchange fees and payment card networks: economics, industry developments, and policy issues," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    17. James J. McAndrews & Zhu Wang, 2006. "Microfoundations of two-sided markets: the payment card example," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 06-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    18. Nicole Jonker & Anneke Kosse & Lola Hernández, 2012. "Cash usage in the Netherlands: How much, where, when, who and whenever one wants?," DNB Occasional Studies 1002, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    19. Gabriel Garber & Márcio Issao Nakane, 2016. "Commercial platforms with heterogeneous participants," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_02, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    20. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2005. "The economics of interchange fees and their regulation : an overview," Proceedings – Payments System Research Conferences, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue May, pages 73-120.
    21. Zhu Wang, 2008. "Market structure and credit card pricing: what drives the interchange?," Payments System Research Working Paper PSR WP 06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    22. Fumiko Hayashi, 2008. "The economics of payment card fee structure: what drives payment card rewards?," Research Working Paper RWP 08-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

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