Corruption in Public Procurement Market
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- Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2014. "Participation of Ordinary Investors and Stock Market Quality: A Comparison between Japanese and US Markets," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(5), pages 537-558, December.
- Calogero Guccio & Domenico Lisi & Ilde Rizzo, 2019. "When the purchasing officer looks the other way: on the waste effects of debauched local environment in public works execution," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 205-236, September.
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