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Takeover Waves

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  • Ramon Fauli‐Oller

Abstract

Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (1) a low realization of demand increases the profitability of takeovers; (2) takeovers raise the profitability of future takeovers. A possible explanation of merger races is also obtained by showing that firms buying in the first place pay a lower price for their targets.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramon Fauli‐Oller, 2000. "Takeover Waves," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 189-210, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:9:y:2000:i:3:p:189-210
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x-i1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2014. "Acquisitions by Multinationals and Trade Liberalization," Other publications TiSEM 9dbb83b3-8647-4b5f-952b-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2008. "Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 1-26, May.
    3. Granier, Laurent & Podesta, Marion, 2010. "Bundling and Mergers in Energy Markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1316-1324, November.
    4. David BARTOLINI & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2008. "Are Antitrust Fines Friendly to Competition? An Endogenous Coalition Formation Approach to Collusive Cartels," Working Papers 325, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    5. Head, K. & Mayer, T. & Ries, J., 2000. "Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction : Are FDI Decisions Strategic Complements?," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 2000.49, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    6. Fumagalli, Eileen & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2009. "Sequential cross-border mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 175-187, March.
    7. Helder Vasconcelos, 2010. "Efficiency Gains And Structural Remedies In Merger Control," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 742-766, December.
    8. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2015. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 253-287, June.
    9. Volker Nocke & Michael D. Whinston, 2010. "Dynamic Merger Review," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1201-1251.
    10. Motta, Massimo & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2005. "Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 777-801, December.
    11. Albert Banal-Estañol & Paul Heidhues & Rainer Nitsche & Jo Seldeslachts, 2006. "Merger Clusters during Economic Booms," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    12. Rosa‐Branca Esteves & Helder Vasconcelos, 2015. "Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 523-549, September.
    13. Albert Banal‐Estañol & Paul Heidhues & Rainer Nitsche & Jo Seldeslachts, 2010. "Screening And Merger Activity," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 794-817, December.
    14. Pagnozzi, Marco & Rosato, Antonio, 2016. "Entry by takeover: Auctions vs. bilateral negotiations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 68-84.
    15. Poonam Mehra Singh, 2017. "Competition or Comparative Advantage: What Drives Cross Border Mergers and Acquisitions?," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 15(3), pages 461-488, September.
    16. Salvo, Alberto, 2004. "A general analysis of sequential merger games with an application to cross-border mergers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 6732, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. J. Peter Neary, 2007. "Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(4), pages 1229-1257.
    18. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    19. Qiu, Larry D. & Zhou, Wen, 2006. "International mergers: Incentives and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 38-58, January.
    20. Aune, Finn Roar & Mohn, Klaus & Osmundsen, Petter & Rosendahl, Knut Einar, 2010. "Financial market pressure, tacit collusion and oil price formation," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 389-398, March.
    21. Johan Stennek, 2006. "A new perspective on mergers and acquisitions: Evidence explained, policies prescribed," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 7(1), pages 3-8, April.
    22. Vasconcelos, Helder & Fumagalli, Eileen, 2006. "Cross-Border Merger Waves," CEPR Discussion Papers 5601, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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