Team Formation and Self‐serving Biases
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00247.x
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Brice Corgnet, 2010. "Team Formation and Self-serving Biases," Post-Print hal-02311961, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet, 2007. "Team Formation and Self-serving Biases," Faculty Working Papers 09/07, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
References listed on IDEAS
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999.
"A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gervais, Simon & Odean, Terrance, 2001.
"Learning to be Overconfident,"
The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
- Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, "undated". "Learning To Be Overconfident," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 5-97, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, "undated". "Learning To Be Overconfident," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 05-97, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Jonathan Levin & Steven Tadelis, 2005.
"Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(1), pages 131-171.
- Steven Tadelis & Jonathan Levin, 2004. "Profit Sharing and the Role of Professional Partnerships," 2004 Meeting Papers 156, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, 1997. "Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 109-126, Winter.
- Björn Bartling & Ferdinand A. von Siemens, 2010.
"Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 299-320, June.
- Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2007. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Discussion Papers in Economics 2027, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2007. "Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 217, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
- Daniel P. Forbes & Patricia S. Borchert & Mary E. Zellmer–Bruhn & Harry J. Sapienza, 2006. "Entrepreneurial Team Formation: An Exploration of New Member Addition," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 30(2), pages 225-248, March.
- Bartling, Björn & von Siemens, Ferdinand A., 2010.
"The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents,"
Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 598-607, June.
- Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Papers in Economics 913, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bartling, Björn & Siemens, Ferdinand von, 2006. "The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 115, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007.
"Fairness and Contract Design,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, January.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "Fairness and Contract Design," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 67, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2007. "Fairness and contract design," Munich Reprints in Economics 20618, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Florian Englmaier & Achim Wambach, 2002.
"Contracts and Inequity Aversion,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
809, CESifo.
- Englmaier, Florian & Achim Wambach, 2003. "Contracts and Inequity Aversion," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 74, Royal Economic Society.
- Cooper, Arnold C. & Woo, Carolyn Y. & Dunkelberg, William C., 1988. "Entrepreneurs' perceived chances for success," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 97-108.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Discussion Papers 471, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
- Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-817, August.
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Luís Santos-Pinto & Joel Sobel, 2005. "A Model of Positive Self-Image in Subjective Assessments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1386-1402, December.
- Eric Van den Steen, 2004. "Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1141-1151, September.
- Clarysse, Bart & Moray, Nathalie, 2004. "A process study of entrepreneurial team formation: the case of a research-based spin-off," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 55-79, January.
- McDowell, John M & Smith, Janet Kiholm, 1992. "The Effect of Gender-Sorting on Propensity to Coauthor: Implications for Academic Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(1), pages 68-82, January.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
- Ayvazyan, Z.S. (Айвазян, З.С.) & Bespalov, Sergei (Беспалов, Сергей) & Maracha, Vyacheslav (Марача, Вячеслав), 2017. "Problems of the Strategic Cycle in the System of Public Administration: Optimization of Mechanisms for the Development and Implementation of Decisions [Проблемы Стратегического Цикла В Системе Госу," Working Papers 061703, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.
- Corgnet, Brice, 2005. "Team formation and biased self-attribution," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb055214, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Edward P. Lazear, 1995.
"Personnel Economics,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, April.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2015.
"Desert and inequity aversion in teams,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 42-54.
- David Gill & Rebecca Stone, 2011. "Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams," Economics Series Working Papers 563, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2014. "Desert and Inequity Aversion in Teams," IZA Discussion Papers 8444, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- David, Gill & Rebecca, Stone, 2012. "Desert and inequity aversion in teams," MPRA Paper 36864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021.
"Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 139-167, February.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2019. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 19-30, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021. "Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams," Post-Print halshs-03031374, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian C. Gunia & Roberto Hernán-González, 2021. "Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams," Post-Print hal-03188236, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 2006, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian C. Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers 20-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2020. "Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams," Working Papers halshs-02483217, HAL.
- Bartling, Björn, 2011. "Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 183-193, August.
- Ann Bartel & Brianna Cardiff-Hicks & Kathryn Shaw, 2013. "Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm," NBER Working Papers 19412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Livio, Luca & De Chiara, Alessandro, 2019.
"Friends or foes? Optimal incentives for reciprocal agents,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 245-278.
- Luca Livio, 2018. "Friends or Foes? Optimal Incentives for Reciprocal Agents," Working Papers ECARES 2018-03, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2012.
"Personnel Economics [The Handbook of Organizational Economics],"
Introductory Chapters,,
Princeton University Press.
- Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, 2007. "Personnel Economics," NBER Working Papers 13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sacha Kapoor, 2020. "Inefficient incentives and nonprice allocations: Experimental evidence from big‐box restaurants," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 401-419, April.
- Banerjee, Swapnendu & Chakraborty, Somenath, 2022. "Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences," MPRA Paper 120996, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017.
"Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2168-2203, August.
- Friebel, Guido & Zubanov, Nick & Heinz, Matthias & Krüger, Miriam, 2015. "Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain," CEPR Discussion Papers 10796, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Friebel, Guido & Heinz, Matthias & Krueger, Miriam & Zubanov, Nikolay, 2017. "Team incentives and performance: Evidence from a retail chain," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168285, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Friebel, Guido & Heinz, Matthias & Krüger, Miriam & Zubanov, Nick, 2015. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," IZA Discussion Papers 9316, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Theilen Bernd, 2009.
"Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-29, June.
- Bernd Theilen, 2008. "Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2453, CESifo.
- Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004.
"Referrals,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June.
- Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2001. "Referrals," NBER Working Papers 8367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Philip Babcock & Kelly Bedard & Gary Charness & John Hartman & Heather Royer, 2015.
"Letting Down The Team? Social Effects Of Team Incentives,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(5), pages 841-870, October.
- Babcock, Philip & Bedard, Kelly & Charness, Gary & Hartman, John & Royer, Heather, 2012. "Letting Down the Team? Social Effects of Team Incentives," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt93n646db, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011.
"Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets,"
Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772,
Elsevier.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2010. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 5058, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2010. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches To Agency and Labor Markets," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_607, Levy Economics Institute.
- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2019.
"Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 1-32, November.
- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2014. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," CESifo Working Paper Series 5131, CESifo.
- Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Economics working papers 2017-13, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Fahn, Matthias & Hakenes, Hendrik, 2017. "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 42, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Michael T. Rauh, 2007. "Incentives, Solidarity, and the Division of Labor," Working Papers 2007-15, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Brice Corgnet, 2018.
"Rac(g)e Against the Machine? Social Incentives When Humans Meet Robots,"
Post-Print
halshs-01984467, HAL.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez & Ricardo Mateo, 2019. "Rac(g)e Against the Machine? Social Incentives When Humans Meet Robots," Working Papers halshs-01994021, HAL.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:19:y:2010:i:1:p:117-135. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.