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Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen

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  • Reiko Gotoh
  • Kotaro Suzumura
  • Naoki Yoshihara

Abstract

We examine the possibility of constructing social ordering functions, each of which associates a social ordering over the feasible pairs of allocations and allocation rules with each simple production economy. Three axioms on the admissible class of social ordering functions are introduced, which embody the values of procedural fairness, non‐welfaristic egalitarianism, and welfaristic consequentialism, respectively. The logical compatibility of these axioms and their lexicographic combinations subject to constraints are examined. Two social ordering functions that give priority to procedural values rather than to consequential values are identified. These two can uniformly rationalize a nice allocation rule in terms of the values of procedural fairness, non‐welfaristic egalitarianism, and Pareto efficiency.

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  • Reiko Gotoh & Kotaro Suzumura & Naoki Yoshihara, 2005. "Extended social ordering functions for rationalizing fair allocation rules as game forms in the sense of Rawls and Sen," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 21-41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:1:y:2005:i:1:p:21-41
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2005.00003.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Naoki Yoshihara, 2000. "On Effcient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games," Discussion Paper Series a397, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2014. "Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(4), pages 265-287, December.

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