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Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers

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  • Hans Gersbach
  • Volker Hahn

Abstract

We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central‐bank council members is socially desirable when the preferences of the central bankers differ. We identify two positive effects of transparency. First, central bankers whose preferences differ from those of society may act in the interest of society in order to increase their re‐appointment chances. Second, transparency enhances the efficiency of the appointment process since the government can align the preferences of the central‐bank council with those of the public over time. In a monetary union, our findings about the desirability of transparency may be reversed.

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  • Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2004. "Voting Transparency, Conflicting Interests, And The Appointment Of Central Bankers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 321-345, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:3:p:321-345
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00142.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anne Sibert, 2003. "Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective Reputations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 649-665.
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    3. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
    5. Meade, Ellen E & Sheets, D Nathan, 2005. "Regional Influences on FOMC Voting Patterns," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(4), pages 661-677, August.
    6. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    7. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Petra Geraats, 2014. "Monetary Policy Transparency," CESifo Working Paper Series 4611, CESifo.
    2. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    3. Mike Felgenhauer & Hans Peter Grüner, 2008. "Committees and Special Interests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 219-243, April.
    4. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372.
    5. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2007. "Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-055/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:17:y:2019:i:1:p:50000000005877 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Mattozzi, Andrea; Nakaguma, Marcos Y., 2016. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees," Economics Working Papers ECO2016/08, European University Institute.
    8. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    9. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
    10. Hofer. Katharina, 2016. "Shirk or Work? On How Legislators React to Monitoring," Economics Working Paper Series 1616, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    11. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," Working Papers in Public Economics 115, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    12. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Unions, Fiscal Policy And Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(5), pages 617-633, September.
    13. Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Committees, sequential voting and transparency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 366-385, November.
    14. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
    15. Petra M. Geraats, 2006. "Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 52(1), pages 111-152, March.
    16. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2009. "Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(5), pages 831-853, August.
    17. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    18. Christine Benesch & Monika Bütler & Katharina Hofer, 2019. "Who Benefits from More Transparency in Parliamentary Voting?," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(01), pages 36-41, May.
    19. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    20. Jan C. van Ours, 2022. "How Retirement Affects Mental Health, Cognitive Skills and Mortality; an Overview of Recent Empirical Evidence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-050/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    21. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    22. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

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