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High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1 Percent? Lessons from a Life-Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk

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  • Fabian Kindermann
  • Dirk Krueger

Abstract

This paper argues that high marginal labor income tax rates on top earners are an effective tool for social insurance even when households have high labor supply elasticity, households make dynamic savings decisions, and policies have general equilibrium effects. We construct a large-scale overlapping generations model with uninsurable labor productivity risk, show that it has a realistic wealth distribution, and numerically characterize the optimal top marginal rate. We find that marginal tax rates for top 1 percent earners of 79 percent are optimal as long as the model earnings and wealth distributions display a degree of concentration as observed in US data.

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  • Fabian Kindermann & Dirk Krueger, 2022. "High Marginal Tax Rates on the Top 1 Percent? Lessons from a Life-Cycle Model with Idiosyncratic Income Risk," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 319-366, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:14:y:2022:i:2:p:319-66
    DOI: 10.1257/mac.20150170
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    2. Macnamara, Patrick & Pidkuyko, Myroslav & Rossi, Raffaele, 2024. "Marginal tax rates and income in the long run: Evidence from a structural estimation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    3. Nezih Guner & Martin Lopez-Daneri & Gustavo Ventura, 2023. "The Looming Fiscal Reckoning: Tax Distortions, Top Earners, and Revenues," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 146-170, October.
    4. Di Nola, Alessandro & Kocharkov, Georgi & Scholl, Almuth & Tkhir, Anna-Mariia & Wang, Haomin, 2022. "Taxation of Top Incomes and Tax Avoidance," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics 264016, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Dirk Krueger & Alexander Ludwig & Irina Popova, 2024. "Shaping Inequality and Intergenerational Persistence of Poverty: Free College or Better Schools," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-023, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Heer, Burkhard & Polito, Vito & Wickens, Michael R., 2023. "Pension Systems (Un)sustainability and Fiscal Constraints: A Comparative Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 18181, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Daniel R. Carroll & Andre Luduvice & Eric Young, 2023. "Optimal Fiscal Reform with Many Taxes," Working Papers 23-07R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 28 Aug 2024.
    8. Luisa Fuster, 2022. "Macroeconomic and distributive effects of increasing taxes in Spain," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 613-648, December.
    9. Nezih Guner & Martin Lopez-Daneri & Gustavo Ventura, 2023. "The Looming Fiscal Reckoning: Tax Distortions, Top Earners, and Revenues," Working Papers wp2023_2305, CEMFI.
    10. Barış Kaymak & David Leung & Markus Poschke, 2022. "Accounting for Wealth Concentration in the United States," Working Papers 22-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    11. Conesa, Juan Carlos & Li, Bo & Li, Qian, 2023. "A quantitative evaluation of universal basic income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 223(C).
    12. Kitae Cho & Eunseong Ma, 2024. "Designing Optimal Progressive Taxation with Hours Constraints," Working papers 2024rwp-231, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    13. Kindermann, Fabian & Pueschel, Veronika, 2021. "Progressive Pensions as an Incentive for Labor Force Participation," CEPR Discussion Papers 16380, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D15 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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