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The Power of Example: Corruption Spurs Corruption

Author

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  • Nicolás Ajzenman

Abstract

Does political corruption erode civic values and foster dishonest behavior? I test this hypothesis in the context of Mexico by combining data on local government corruption and cheating on school tests. I find that, following revelations of corruption by local officials, secondary students' cheating on cognitive tests increases significantly. The effect is large and robust and persists for over a year after malfeasance is revealed. These findings are validated by evidence from individual survey data, which documents that individuals interviewed right after corruption is revealed report being less honest, less trustworthy, and more prone to thinking that cheating is necessary to succeed, compared to similar individuals interviewed just beforehand.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolás Ajzenman, 2021. "The Power of Example: Corruption Spurs Corruption," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(2), pages 230-257, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:13:y:2021:i:2:p:230-57
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20180612
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Goerg, Sebastian J. & Himmler, Oliver & König, Tobias, 2024. "Norm violations and behavioral spillovers—Evidence from the lab and the field," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    2. Shuguang Jiang & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022. "Dishonesty in Developing Countries -What Can We Learn From Experiments?," Working Papers hal-03899654, HAL.
    3. Ajzenman, Nicolás & Ardanaz, Martín & Cruces, Guillermo & Feierherd, Germán & Lunghi, Ignacio, 2024. "Unraveling the Paradox of Anticorruption Messaging: Experimental Evidence from a Tax Administration Reform," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 13555, Inter-American Development Bank.
    4. Guillermo Cruces & Martín A. Rossi & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2023. "Dishonesty and Public Employment," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 511-526, December.
    5. Hübler, Olaf & Koch, Melanie & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2021. "Corruption and cheating: Evidence from rural Thailand," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    6. Giorgio Gulino & Federico Masera, 2023. "Contagious Dishonesty: Corruption Scandals and Supermarket Theft," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 218-251, October.
    7. Markussen, Thomas & Sharma, Smriti & Singhal, Saurabh & Tarp, Finn, 2021. "Inequality, institutions and cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    8. Huber, Christoph & Litsios, Christos & Nieper, Annika & Promann, Timo, 2023. "On social norms and observability in (dis)honest behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1086-1099.
    9. Juan I Block & Rohan Dutta & David K Levine, 2021. "Leaders and Social Norms: On the Emergence of Consensus or Conflict," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001758, David K. Levine.
    10. Abu Bakkar Siddique, 2024. "Corruption spills over on citizens: The case of self‐reported motivation to cheat on tax," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 839-860, July.
    11. Remo Nitschke & Felix Roesel, 2023. "Elite Persistence and Policy Persistence: Re-Installed Mayors from Weimar Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 10251, CESifo.
    12. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2023. "Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    13. Chen, Shuo & Ding, Haoyuan & Lin, Shu & Ye, Haichun, 2022. "From past lies to current misconduct: The long shadow of China's Great Leap Forward," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).
    14. Charroin, Liza & Fortin, Bernard & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2022. "Peer effects, self-selection and dishonesty," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 618-637.
    15. Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022. "Peer effects, self-selection and dishonesty," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03712450, HAL.
    16. Liza Charroin & Bernard Fortin & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022. "Peer effects, self-selection and dishonesty," Post-Print hal-03712450, HAL.
    17. Tsur, Yacov, 2022. "Political tenure, term limits and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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