The Economics of Citation

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UConn-Wesleyan 2007 Workshop

The Questions

What strategies do authors use when choosing whom to cite?

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- Become more convincing by citing respected authors
- Cater to editors and potential referees
- Look more competent that cited authors

The Effects

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Correlation effect

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Correlation effect

Reputation effect

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Correlation effect
Cite authors ranked higher
Reputation effect

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Correlation effect

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Reputation effect

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The Environment

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Correlation effect of citation.

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

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

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

$$RANK\_CITED = \beta_0 + \underset{(0.002)}{0.05} \; RANK + e$$

Reputation effect I

$$P(RANK\_CITED > RANK)$$

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

Reputation effect II

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

Regional differences

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- Tobit results:

Var.	Coeff	St. Err.	T
RANK_NW	-0.00066	0.00001	-60.76
EUROPE	-0.438	0.0648	-6.76
OTHERS	-0.452	0.105	-4.29

Conclusions

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2. Reputation effect: cite more selectively when uncertainty about own competence

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3. North-American bias