# David K. Levine

# Levine's Working Paper Archive

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### 2010

**661465000000000321 History-Dependent Risk Attitude***by*David Dillenberger & Kareen Rozen**661465000000000312 On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis**661465000000000308 Communicating Technical Knowledge***by*James E. Bessen**661465000000000304 Time-Consistent Majority Rules and Heterogenous Preferences in Group Decision-Making***by*Huseyin Yildirim**661465000000000298 Online Privacy and Price Discrimination***by*Curtis R. Taylor & Vincent Conitzer & Liad Wagman**661465000000000294 Unobserved Heterogeneity and Reserve Prices in Auctions***by*James W. Roberts**661465000000000289 Verifiability and Group Formation in Markets***by*Suzanne Scotchmer & Chris Shannon**661465000000000284 Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media***by*Dirk Bergemann & Alessandro Bonatti**661465000000000279 Managing Strategic Buyers***by*Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson**661465000000000273 Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi**661465000000000268 The Condorcet Jur(ies) Theorem***by*David S Ahn & Santiago Oliveros**661465000000000263 Combinatorial Voting***by*David S. Ahn & Santiago Oliveros**661465000000000258 Torture***by*Sandeep Baliga & Jeffrey C. Ely**661465000000000253 Intertemporal Preference for Flexibility***by*Philipp Sadowski & Vijay Krishna**661465000000000249 Inside Organizations: Pricing, Politics, and Path Dependence***by*Robert S. Gibbons**661465000000000243 Competing Engines of Growth: Innovation and Standardization***by*Daron Acemoglu & Gino Gancia & Fabrizio Zilibotti**661465000000000237 Beauty Contests and Irrational Exuberance: A Neoclassical Approach***by*George-Marios Angeletos & Guido Lorenzoni & Alessandro Pavan**661465000000000232 Moral Hazard and Efficiency in General Equilibrium with Anonymous Trading***by*Daron Acemoglu & Alp Simsek**661465000000000227 Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents***by*Daron Acemoglu & Dan Vu Cao**661465000000000222 Opinion Dynamics and Learning in Social Networks***by*Daron Acemoglu & Asuman E. Ozdaglar**661465000000000216 Dynamics of Information Exchange in Endogenous Social Networks***by*Daron Acemoglu & Kostas Bimpikis & Asuman E, Ozdaglar**661465000000000208 Opinion Fluctuations and Disagreement in Social Networks***by*Daron Acemoglu & Giacomo Como & Fabio Fagnani & Asuman E. Ozdaglar**661465000000000203 Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games***by*Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson**661465000000000193 Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership***by*David McAdams**661465000000000189 Discounts For Quali ed Buyers Only***by*David McAdams**661465000000000155 Virtual Model Validation for Economics***by*David K Levine**661465000000000149 A Theory of Firm Decline***by*Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas F. Cooley & Sonia B. Di Giannatale**661465000000000143 Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes***by*Alessandra Casella & Aniol Llorente-Saguer & Thomas R. Palfrey**661465000000000139 Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy***by*Pinghan Liang**661465000000000133 Mediation and Peace***by*Johannes Horner & Massimo Morelli & Francesco Squintani**661465000000000128 Should Auctions Be Transparent?***by*Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner**661465000000000123 Affective Decision-Making: A Theory of Optimism-Bias***by*Anat Bracha & Donald Brown**661465000000000117 The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade***by*Dino Gerardi & Johannes Horner & Lucas Maestri**661465000000000111 Dynamic Auctions: A Survey***by*Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said**661465000000000106 Revealed Political Power***by*Jinhui H. Bai & Roger Laguno ff**661465000000000098 The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments***by*David K Levine & Jie Zheng**661465000000000094 Preference for Randomization - Ambiguity Aversion and Inequality Aversion***by*Kota Saito**661465000000000083 Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values***by*Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano**661465000000000078 Regret Matching with Finite Memory***by*Rene Saran & Roberto Serrano**661465000000000073 The 11-20 Money Request Game: Evaluating the Upper Bound of k-Level Reasoning***by*Ayala Arad & Ariel Rubinstein**661465000000000068 Why Stare Decisis?***by*Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni**661465000000000062 Expanding “Choice” in School Choice***by*Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda**661465000000000056 Quality, Upgrades, and Equilibrium in a Dynamic Monopoly Model***by*James Anton & Gary Biglaiser**661465000000000051 International Trade, Factor Mobility and the Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity***by*Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles**661465000000000046 A reason-based theory of rational choice***by*Franz Dietrich & Christian List**661465000000000040 Collateralized Security Markets***by*John Geanakoplos & William R. Zame**661465000000000035 Dynamic Auctions: A Survey***by*Dirk Bergemann & Maher Said**661465000000000028 Quality Ladders, Competition and Endogenous Growth***by*Michele Boldrin & David K Levine**661465000000000022 Rationalizable Implementation***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Olivier Tercieux**661465000000000017 Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms***by*Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris**661465000000000011 Pricing in Matching Markets***by*George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson**661465000000000006 Introduction to Judgment Aggregation***by*Christian List & Ben Polak**661465000000000001 Stochastic Search Equilibrium***by*Giuseppe Moscarini & Fabien Postel-Vinay**659843000000000008 Timing and Self-Control***by*Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine**659843000000000001 Production Chains***by*David K Levine**64 Developing an Exchange Network Simulator***by*Barry Markovsky**631 Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching***by*Glen Ellison**630 Social Norms and Community Enforcement***by*Michi Kandori**625018000000000099 Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules***by*Tilman Borgers & Antonio Morales & Rajiv Sarin**621 Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining***by*Douglas Gale**618897000000000060 Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations***by*Martin Cripps & George J Mailath & Larry Samuelson**605 Commitment Through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game***by*K. Schmidt**599 The Evolution of Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma***by*John Nachbar**587 Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality***by*John Geanakoplos & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti**584 Calibrated Forecasting and Merging***by*Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer & Rann Smorodinsky**583 A 2 ×2 Game without the Fictitious Play Property***by*Dov Monderer & Aner Sela**582 On 'Reputation' Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs***by*J. Watson & P. Battigalli**580 A ‘Reputation’ Refinement without Equilibrium***by*J. Watson**578 Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition and Nash Equilibrium***by*D. Sonsino**576 Prediction, Optimization and Learning in Repeated Games***by*John Nachbar**575 The Weighted Majority Algorithm***by*N. Littlestone & M. Warmuth**574 Using Experts for Predicting Continuous Outcomes***by*J. Kivinen & M. Warmuth**573 Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games***by*J. Jordan**572 A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium***by*S. Hart & A. Mas-Collel**570 A Decision Theoretic Generalization of On-Line Learning and an Application to Boosting***by*Y. Freund & R. Schapire**569 Regret in the On-line Decision Problem***by*D. Foster & R. Vohra**568 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium***by*D. Foster & R. Vohra**567 Universal Prediction of Individual Sequences***by*M. Feder & N. Mehrav & M. Gutman**566 Learning Probabilistic Prediction Functions***by*A. Desantis & G. Markowski & M. Wegman**565 Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information***by*D. Blackwell & L. Dubins**564 Approximate Methods for Sequential Decision Making Using Expert Advice***by*T.H. Chung**563 Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games***by*M. Benaim & M. W. Hirsch**562 Evolution of Beliefs and the Nash Equilibrium of a Normal Form Game***by*M. Aoyagi**561 Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata***by*K. Binmore & L. Samuelson**560 Decision-making behavior in two-choice uncertain outcome situations***by*S. Siegel & D A Goldstein**559 Decision-making behavior in two-choice uncertain outcome situations***by*S. Siegel & D. A. Goldstein**553 Probability Learning in 1000 Trials***by*W. Edwards**550 Using genetic algorithms to model the evolution of heterogenous beliefs***by*James Bullard & John Duffy**546 Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games***by*D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin**544 Strategic Information Transmission***by*V. Crawford & J. Sobel**543 Evolutionary Stability in Unanimity Games with Cheap Talk***by*K. Warneryd**542 On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence***by*Dale O. Stahl & Paul W. Wilson**541 Cheap Talk and Evolutionary Dynamics***by*K. Schlag**540 Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash and the Secret Handshake***by*A. J. Robson**539 Communication Between Rational Agents***by*M. Rabin**538 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction***by*G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson**537 Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept***by*R. Myerson**536 Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society***by*A. Matsui**535 Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices***by*J.C. Gittens**534 Social Stability and Equilibrium***by*I. Gilboa & A. Matsui**533 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap Talk Games***by*J. Farrell**532 On the Uniform Consistency of Bayes Estimates with Multinomial Probabilities***by*P. Diaconis & D. Freedman**530 Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication***by*A. Blume & Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel**53 On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory***by*Daniel Friedman**529 Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium***by*E. Kalai & E. Lehrer**526 Exercises in Conjectural Equilibrium***by*Frank Hahn**523 Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection***by*D. Pearce**518 Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium***by*D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps**516 An Approach to Communication Equilibrium***by*F. Forges**514 Rationalizable Strategic Behavior***by*D. B. Bernheim**510 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games***by*R. McKelvey & T. Palfrey**506439000000000472 Information, evolution and utility***by*Larry Samuelson & Jeroen Swinkels**506439000000000355 Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence***by*John Duffy & Ed Hopkins**506439000000000346 Adaptive Learning Models of Consumer Behaviour***by*Ed Hopkins**506439000000000336 Market Research and Market Design***by*Sandeep Baliga & Rakesh Vohra**506439000000000295 On the Irrelevance of Government Debt When Taxes are Distortionary***by*Marco Bassetto & Narayana Kocherlakota**506439000000000291 Figuring out the impact of hidden savings on optimal unemployment insuranc***by*Narayana Kocherlakota**506439000000000176 Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment***by*Vasiliki Skreta**506439000000000168 Nonlinear Forecasting Analysis Using Diffusion Indexes: An Application to Japan***by*Mototsugu Shintani**506439000000000119 Equilibria in Systems of Social Interactions***by*U. Horst & Jose A. Scheinkman**506439000000000108 Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns***by*Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein**506439000000000092 Competing Auctions***by*Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius**506439000000000084 Time Inconsistency and Free-Riding in a Monetary Union***by*V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe**506439000000000050 Party formation in collective decision-making***by*Martin J Osborne & Rabee Tourky**506439000000000043 On the Size and Structure of Group cooperation***by*Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff**505 p-dominance and Belief Potential***by*S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin**503 Equilibrium Selection in n-person Coordination Games***by*Y. Kim**502 Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications***by*M. Kandori & R. Rob**501 Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice***by*M. Kandori & R. Rob**50 Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance and Probabilistic Choice Learning***by*Raymond Battalio & Larry Samuelson & John Van Huyck**497 Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models***by*Carl Futia**496 Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks***by*D. Fudenberg & C. Harris**494 Cooperation in the Short and in the Long Run***by*Peyton Young & Dean Foster**493 Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics***by*D. Foster & P. Young**492 Local Conventions***by*Jeffrey Ely**491 Basins of Attraction and Long-Run Equilibria***by*G. Ellison**490 Average Behavior in Learning Models***by*D. Canning**489 Stochastic Replicator Dynamics***by*A. Cabrales**488 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction***by*L. Blume**487 Musical Chairs: Modelling Noisy Evolution***by*K. Binmore & L. Samuelson & K. Vaughn**486 Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations***by*J. Bergin & B. Lipman**484 A Probabilistic Model of Learning in Games***by*C. Sanchirico**483 Non-convergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations***by*R. Pemantle**481 Learning Automata: a Survey***by*K. Narendra & M. Thatcher**480 On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information Played with Non-Bayesian Players***by*N. Megiddo**476 Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations***by*Y. Kanivokski & P. Young**475 Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Equilibria***by*J. Jordan**474 Learning by Forgetful Players: From Primitive Formations to Persistent Retracts***by*S. Hurkens**469 Synchronous and Asynchronous Learning by Responsive Learning Automata***by*E. Friedman & S. Shenker**468 Asymptotic Calibration***by*D. Foster & R. Vohra**466 An Analog of the Minmax Theorem for Vector Payoffs***by*D. Blackwell**465 Controlled Random Walks***by*D. Blackwell**464 Learning Processes, Mixed Equilibria and Dynamical Systems Arising from Repeated Games***by*M. Benaim & M. W. Hirsch**463 On Pseudo-Games***by*A. Banos**462 Gambling in a rigged casino: The adversarial multi-armed bandit problem***by*P. Auer & N. Cesa-Bianchi & Y. Freund & R. Schapire**458 Psychophysical Analysis***by*L. Thurstone**457 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics***by*P. Taylor & L. Jonker**456 Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games***by*J. Swinkels**455 Coyness, Philandering and Stable Strategies***by*Schuster & K. Sigmund**454 Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution***by*K. Schlag**453 Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games***by*L. Samuelson & J. Zhang**452 Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games***by*K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull**449 Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complements***by*Paul Milgrom & John Roberts**448 The Theory of Games and Evolution of Animal Conflicts***by*J. Maynard Smith**447 Models of Integration Given Multiple Sources of Information***by*D. Massaro & D. Friedman**444 Evolutionary Selection against dominated strategies***by*J. Hofbauer & J. Weibull**441 A Note on Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics***by*J. Hofbauer & P. Schuster & K. Sigmund**440 Evolutionary Dynamics for Bimatrix Games: A Hamiltonian system?***by*J. Hofbauer**438 Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation***by*A. Gaunersdorfer & J. Hofbauer**437 Coevolutionary instability of mixed Nash solutions***by*I. Eshel & E. Akin**435 Rules of Thumb for Social Learning***by*G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg**434 On the Evolution of Optimizing Behavior***by*E. Dekel & S. Scotchmer**432 On the Limit Points of Discrete Selection Dynamics***by*Antonio Cabrales & Joel Sobel**430 Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation***by*R. Boylan**426 Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection***by*Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson**425 Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning***by*A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg**424 Evolutionary Dynamics of zero-sum games***by*E. Akin & V. Losert**420 Belief Affirming in Learning Processes***by*Dov Monderer & Dov Samet & Aner Sela**419 On the Convergence of Learning Processes in a 2x2 Non-Zero-Person Game***by*K. Miyasawa**418 Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Repeated Normal-Form Games***by*Paul Milgrom & John Roberts**417 On the Convergence of Fictitious Play***by*Vijay Krishna & T. Sjostrom**415 Learning Mixed Equilibria***by*Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps**413 Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia***by*Glen Ellison**407 Fictitious Play By Cases***by*M. Li Calzi**404 Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games***by*V. Crawford**403 Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments***by*R. Boylan & E. El-Gamal**402 Computing Equilibria of n-person Games***by*Robert Wilson**401 Evolution of Smart n Players***by*D. Stahl**400 Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Theory***by*B. Skyrms**397 A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs***by*Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole**393 Equilibrium in Evolutionary Games: Some Experimental Results***by*Dan Friedman**392 Evolutionary Games in Economics***by*Dan Friedman**391749000000000040 Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation***by*Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet**391749000000000034 Learning To Play Games In Extensive Form By Valuation***by*Philippe Jehiel & Dov Samet**391 Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination***by*Glen Ellison**390 Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection***by*Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson**389 Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies***by*R. Aumann**387 Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run***by*A. Roth & I. Er’ev**386 Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information***by*P. Reny**382 Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium***by*D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps