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Citations for " Communication in Dynastic Repeated Games: `Whitewashes' and `Coverups' "

by Luca Anderlini & Roger Lagunoff

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  1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "Communication and Learning," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 82, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2010.
  2. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Game Theory and Information 0203003, EconWPA.
  3. Kurt Annen, 2011. "Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 269-285, July.
  4. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2008. "A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 357-394, December.
  6. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
  7. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Working Papers gueconwpa~07-07-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Ichiro Obara, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 365, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
  10. Rich McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000261, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000926, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Ando, Munetomo & Kobayashi, Hajime, 2008. "Intergenerational conflicts of interest and seniority systems in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 757-767, March.
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