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Citations for "Evolution of Preferences"

by Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan

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  1. A. Capparos & Jean-Christophe Pereau & Tarik Tazdait, 2010. "Mutual Aid: an indirect Evolution Analysis," Post-Print hal-00645554, HAL.
  2. David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State," NBER Working Papers 19221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Mohlin, Erik, 2012. "Evolution of theories of mind," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 299-318.
  4. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2004. "What to Maximize if You Must," Discussion Papers 1414, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Possajennikov, Alexandre, 2002. "Two-speed evolution of strategies and preferences in symmetric games," Papers 02-03, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
  6. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Where do preferences come from?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00978007, HAL.
  7. Ingela Alger & Donald Cox, 2013. "The evolution of altruistic preferences: mothers versus fathers," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 421-446, September.
  8. Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series dp521, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  9. Kai A. Konrad & Florian Morath, 2011. "Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict," Working Papers evolutionarily_stable, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
  10. Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella & Talley, Eric, 2007. "Market design with endogenous preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 121-153, January.
  11. David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2012. "Evolving to the impatience trap: the example of the farmer-sheriff game," Working Papers 2012-033, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  12. Erik Mohlin, 2010. "Internalized social norms in conflicts: an evolutionary approach," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 169-181, April.
  13. David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2012. "Conflict and the evolution of societies," Working Papers 2012-032, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
  14. Franz Dietrich, 2012. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework," Post-Print halshs-00977998, HAL.
  15. Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2002. "What to Maximize If You Must," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0hj6631n, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  16. von Widekind, Sven, 2011. "Evolution of non-expected utility preferences," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 370, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  17. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
  18. Heller, Yuval & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Rule Rationality," MPRA Paper 48746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Manapat, Michael L. & Nowak, Martin A. & Rand, David G., 2013. "Information, irrationality, and the evolution of trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages S57-S75.
  20. DellaVigna, Stefano & LiCalzi, Marco, 2001. "Learning to make risk neutral choices in a symmetric world," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, January.
  21. Julian Jamison, 2012. "Games with Synergistic Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(1), pages 41-55, March.
  22. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2009. "Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 542-551, November.
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