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Citations for "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition"

by Prendergast, Canice

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  1. Silva, António Dias da & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions Inside and Between Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum 27/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  3. David H. Autor, 2000. "Outsourcing at Will: Unjust Dismissal Doctrine and the Growth of Temporary Help Employment," NBER Working Papers 7557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  5. Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  6. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Dohmen, Thomas, 2003. "Performance, Seniority and Wages: Formal Salary Systems and Individual Earnings Profiles," IZA Discussion Papers 935, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Mori, Pier Angelo, 1998. "Promotion careers with multiple punitive assignments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 369-373, September.
  9. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. James Malcomson, 2010. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Economics Series Working Papers 508, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  12. Chiaki Moriguchi, 2003. "Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920-1940," NBER Working Papers 9559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
  14. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  15. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2013. "Yes Men in Tournaments," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(4), pages 621-659, December.
  16. Ryan Kellogg, 2011. "Learning by Drilling: Interfirm Learning and Relationship Persistence in the Texas Oilpatch," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1961-2004.
  17. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
  18. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Firm Provision of General Training and Specific Human Capital Acquisition," Economics Series Working Papers 198, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  19. Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  20. Anderhub, Vital & Königstein, Manfred & Kübler, Dorothea, 1999. "Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,43, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  21. David Fairris & Roberto Pedace, 2004. "The Impact of Minimum Wages on Job Training: An Empirical Exploration with Establishment Data," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 566-583, January.
  22. Pfeiffer, Friedhelm & Reize, Frank, 2000. "Formelle und informelle berufliche Weiterbildung und Verdienst bei Arbeitnehmern und Selbständigen," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-01, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  23. Mobbs, Shawn & Raheja, Charu G., 2012. "Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1337-1353.
  24. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 413, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  25. Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher J, 2004. "Firm-Specific Training," CEPR Discussion Papers 4580, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  27. Devereux, Paul J. & Hart, Robert A. & Roberts, J. Elizabeth, 2013. "Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure," IZA Discussion Papers 7384, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  28. Statt, A.L., 1998. "Training and Displacement: is Employer Paid Training Firm-Specific?," Working Papers Series 9801, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  29. Christian Lukas, 2007. "Managerial expertise, learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 195-211.
  30. Daniel van Vuuren & Paul de Hek, 2010. "Are older workers overpaid? A literature review," CPB Discussion Paper 165, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  31. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  32. Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1998. "German Job Mobility and Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 4, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  33. repec:crs:ecosta:es423b is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-05, CIRANO.
  35. Jonker N. & Grip A. de, 1999. "Do employees with Flexible Contracts receive less Training?," ROA Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
  36. Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  37. Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," NBER Working Papers 13653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  38. Jean-Michel Plassard & Philippe Lemistre, 2002. "Stratégies de mobilité et rendements de l'ancienneté en France," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 155(4), pages 45-60.
  39. Chiaki Moriguchi, 2000. "The Evolution of Employment Relations in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Firms, 1900-1960: A Comparative Historical and Institutional Analysis," NBER Working Papers 7939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  40. Pierre Malgrange & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "L'économie des ressources humaines : pouvoir et limites des incitations. Aperçu théorique et présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 1-15.
  41. Hara, Hiromi, 2014. "The impact of firm-provided training on productivity, wages, and transition to regular employment for workers in flexible arrangements," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 336-359.
  42. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2010. "Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 36-44, March.
  43. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1996. "Endogenous on-the-job training with moral hazard," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 81-92, August.
  44. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  45. Giorgio Brunello & Maria De Paola, 2004. "Market Failures and the Under-Provision of Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 1286, CESifo Group Munich.
  46. Eleonora Fichera & James Banks & Matt Sutton, 2014. "Health behaviours and the patient-doctor interaction: The double moral hazard problem," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1415, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  47. repec:dgr:uvatin:20060084 is not listed on IDEAS
  48. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  49. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  50. Rudi Stracke & Wolfgang Höchtl & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Uwe Sunde, 2014. "Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone?," Working Papers 2014-09, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  51. Markus Pannenberg, 1996. "Financing On-The-Job Training: Shared Investment or Promotion Based System?: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 135, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  52. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  53. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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