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Citations for "The Role of Promotion in Inducing Specific Human Capital Acquisition"

by Prendergast, Canice

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  1. Christian Lukas, 2007. "Managerial expertise, learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(3), pages 195-211.
  2. Pierre Malgrange & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2004. "L'économie des ressources humaines : pouvoir et limites des incitations. Aperçu théorique et présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 164(3), pages 1-15.
  3. Chiaki Moriguchi, 2000. "The Evolution of Employment Relations in U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing Firms, 1900-1960: A Comparative Historical and Institutional Analysis," NBER Working Papers 7939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003. "General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
  5. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
  6. Anderhub, Vital & Königstein, Manfred & Kübler, Dorothea, 1999. "Long-term work contracts versus sequential spot markets: Experimental evidence on firm-specific investment," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,43, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  7. Pablo Casas-Arce, 2004. "Firm Provision of General Training and Specific Human Capital Acquisition," Economics Series Working Papers 198, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Hoffler, Felix & Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "Do new brooms sweep clean? When and why dismissing a manager increases the subordinates' performance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 877-890, October.
  9. Melero Martín, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  10. Jin, Xin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Note Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 58484, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. repec:dgr:uvatin:20060084 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Zimmermann, Klaus F., 1998. "German Job Mobility and Wages," IZA Discussion Papers 4, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Clark, D.J. & Riis, C., 1996. "Rank-Order Tournaments and Selection," Memorandum 27/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  14. Leonardo Felli & Christopher Harris, 2004. "Firm-Specific Training," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/473, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  15. Daniel van Vuuren & Paul de Hek, 2010. "Are older workers overpaid? A literature review," CPB Discussion Paper 165, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  16. Mobbs, Shawn & Raheja, Charu G., 2012. "Internal managerial promotions: Insider incentives and CEO succession," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1337-1353.
  17. Eleonora Fichera & James Banks & Matt Sutton, 2014. "Health behaviours and the patient-doctor interaction: The double moral hazard problem," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 1415, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  18. Jonker N. & Grip A. de, 1999. "Do employees with Flexible Contracts receive less Training?," ROA Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA).
  19. Jean-Michel Plassard & Philippe Lemistre, 2002. "Stratégies de mobilité et rendements de l'ancienneté en France," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 155(4), pages 45-60.
  20. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  21. repec:crs:ecosta:es423b is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Ján Zábojník, 2012. "Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 213-240, September.
  23. Devereux, Paul J. & Hart, Robert A. & Roberts, J. Elizabeth, 2013. "Job Spells, Employer Spells, and Wage Returns to Tenure," IZA Discussion Papers 7384, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  24. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  25. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1996. "Endogenous on-the-job training with moral hazard," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 81-92, August.
  26. Dohmen, Thomas, 2003. "Performance, Seniority and Wages: Formal Salary Systems and Individual Earnings Profiles," IZA Discussion Papers 935, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  27. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  28. David H. Autor, 2000. "Outsourcing at Will: Unjust Dismissal Doctrine and the Growth of Temporary Help Employment," JCPR Working Papers 153, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  29. Hara, Hiromi, 2014. "The impact of firm-provided training on productivity, wages, and transition to regular employment for workers in flexible arrangements," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 336-359.
  30. Ryan Kellogg, 2009. "Learning by Drilling: Inter-Firm Learning and Relationship Persistence in the Texas Oilpatch," NBER Working Papers 15060, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  31. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," NBER Working Papers 6695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  32. David Fairris & Roberto Pedace, . "The Impact of Minimum Wages on Job Training: An Empirical Exploration with Establishment Data," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2000-36, Claremont Colleges.
  33. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2007. "“Yes-Men in Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 417, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  34. Silva, António Dias da & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2006. "Wage Dynamics and Promotions Inside and Between Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2351, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  35. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 201-229.
  36. Mori, Pier Angelo, 1998. "Promotion careers with multiple punitive assignments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 369-373, September.
  37. Markus Pannenberg, 1996. "Financing On-The-Job Training: Shared Investment or Promotion Based System?: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 135, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  38. Belzil, Christian & Bognanno, Michael L., 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," IZA Discussion Papers 1003, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  39. Statt, A.L., 1998. "Training and Displacement: is Employer Paid Training Firm-Specific?," Working Papers Series 9801, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  40. Xin Jin, 2014. "The Signaling Role of Not Being Promoted: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 0314, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  41. Rudi Stracke & Wolfgang Höchtl & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Uwe Sunde, 2014. "Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone?," Working Papers 2014-09, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  42. Kiyotaki, Fumi, 2010. "Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 36-44, March.
  43. Chiaki Moriguchi, 2003. "Implicit Contracts, the Great Depression, and Institutional Change: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Japanese Employment Relations, 1920-1940," NBER Working Papers 9559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  44. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  45. Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," NBER Working Papers 13653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  46. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
  47. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2015. "A Tenure-Clock Problem," ISER Discussion Paper 0919, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  48. Baiman, Stanley & Rajan, Madhav V., 2002. "Incentive issues in inter-firm relationships," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 213-238, April.
  49. Giorgio Brunello & Maria De Paola, 2004. "Market Failures and the Under-Provision of Training," CESifo Working Paper Series 1286, CESifo Group Munich.
  50. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 413, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  51. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  52. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2004. "The Promotion Dynamics of American Executives," Post-Print halshs-00180126, HAL.
  53. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  54. Pfeiffer, Friedhelm & Reize, Frank, 2000. "Formelle und informelle berufliche Weiterbildung und Verdienst bei Arbeitnehmern und Selbständigen," ZEW Discussion Papers 00-01, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
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