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Citations for "Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems"

by Paul Belleflamme & Jean Hindriks

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  1. Bischoff, Ivo, 2008. "Conditional Grants, Grant-Seeking and Welfare when there is Government Failure on the Subordinate Level," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-031, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  2. Adam, Antonis & Delis, Manthos D & Kammas, Pantelis, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: Evidence from OECD countries," MPRA Paper 36889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Zafarullah, 2009. "The political economics of the Malaysian subnational governments’ fiscal behavior," MPRA Paper 24988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. HINDRIKS, Jean & LOCKWOOD, Ben, 2004. "Centralization and political accountability," CORE Discussion Papers 2004052, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Timothy Besley & Michael Smart, 2005. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3769, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1865, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Pablo Querubin & James M. Snyder, Jr., 2011. "The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis: Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880," NBER Working Papers 17634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Hendriks, Jean & Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Decentralization and Electoral Accountability : Incentives, Separation, and Voter Welfare," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 729, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  9. Joanis, Marcelin, 2014. "Shared accountability and partial decentralization in local public good provision," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 28-37.
  10. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2012. "Window-Dressing and Lobbying in Performance-Budgeting: a Model for the Public Sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201212, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  11. HINDRIKS, Jean, 2004. "Inter-governmental competition: market solutions to political problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2004087, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Guillaume CHEIKBOSSIAN & Wilfried SAND-ZANTMAN, 2011. "Dynamic Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply with Imperfect Monitoring," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 101-102, pages 327-346.
  13. Viceisza, Angelino, 2008. "An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption:," IFPRI discussion papers 774, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  14. Ngo Van Long & Bodhisattva Sengupta, 2008. "Yardstick Competition, Corruption, and Electoral Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2345, CESifo Group Munich.
  15. Rincke, Johannes, 2005. "Yardstick Competition and Policy Innovation," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-11, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  16. Galina Zudenkova, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," Economics Working Papers we1011, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  17. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
  18. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," MPRA Paper 28800, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Snyder Jr., James M. & Ting, Michael M., 2008. "Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 482-500, April.
  20. Finken, Jan, 2009. "Yardstick competition in German municipalities," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 09-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  21. Ruixin Wang & Wendun Wang, 2013. "Dress-up contest: a dark side of fiscal decentralization," Working Papers 2013/30, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  22. SALMON, Pierre, 2003. "Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2003-03, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  23. Kotsogiannis, Christos & Schwager, Robert, 2008. "Accountability and fiscal equalization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(12), pages 2336-2349, December.
  24. Johannes Rincke, 2009. "Yardstick competition and public sector innovation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 337-361, June.
  25. Caldeira, Emilie, 2012. "Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 878-897.
  26. Geys, Benny & Konrad, Kai A., 2010. "Federalism and optimal allocation across levels of governance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  27. Ivo Bischoff & Frédéric Blaeschke, 2013. "Incentives and Influence Activities in the Public Sector: the Trade-off in Performance Budgeting and Conditional Grants," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201320, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  28. Lockwood, Ben, 2005. "Fiscal Decentralization: A Political Economy Perspective," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 721, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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