IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts"

by V.V. Chari

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1983. "Equilibrium Long-Term Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 23-54, Supplemen.
  2. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995. "Social insurance and transition," Staff Report 202, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  3. Jonathan Thomas, 2000. "Fair Pay and a Wagebill Argument for Wage Rigidity and Excessive Employment Variability," CESifo Working Paper Series 234, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Russell Cooper, 1983. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 647R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Roger A. McCain, 1987. "Acceptable Contracts, Opportunism, and Rigid Hourly Wages," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 205-213, Jul-Sep.
  6. Rosen, Sherwin, 1983. "Unemployment and insurance," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 5-49, January.
  7. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-75, September.
  8. Russell Cooper, 1983. "Worker Asymmetric Information and Involuntary Unemployment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 671R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 1984.
  9. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1995. "Optimal social insurance, incentives, and transition," Working Papers 546, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  10. Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
  11. V.V. Chari, 1984. "Layoffs and Unemployment Compensation as Social Instruments," Discussion Papers 617, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Anne C. Sibert, 1984. "The macroeconomic implications of labor contracting with asymmetric information," International Finance Discussion Papers 248, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  13. Ling-Fan Li, 2009. "After the Great Debasement, 1544-51: did Gresham’s Law apply?," Economic History Working Papers 27874, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  14. Anton Miglo, 2006. "Optimal compensation contracts under asymmetric information concerning expected earnings," Working Papers 0613, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  15. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-75, July.
  16. V.V. Chari & Larry E. Jones & Rodolfo E. Manuelli, 1989. "Labor contracts in a model of imperfect competition," Staff Report 117, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  17. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Ed Nosal & Richard Rogerson & Randall Wright, 1991. "A note on labor contracts with private information and household production," Staff Report 131, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.