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Citations for "Graphs and Cooperation in Games"

by Roger B. Myerson

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  1. Rodrigo J. Harrison & Roberto Munoz, 2003. "Stability and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game," Game Theory and Information 0306004, EconWPA.
  2. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2012. "Weighted component fairness for forest games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 144-151.
  3. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Subscription Mechanisms for Network Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 242-264, October.
  4. Jackson, Matthew O. & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2005. "Strongly stable networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 420-444, May.
  5. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "On the Stability of Cooperation Structures," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 472.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Matthew O. Jackson, 2003. "A survey of models of network formation: Stability and efficiency," Working Papers 1161, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  7. Rod Garratt & James E. Parco & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Amnon Rapoport, 2005. "Potential Maximization And Coalition Government Formation," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(04), pages 407-429.
  8. Goyal, Sanjeev & Joshi, Sumit, 2003. "Networks of collaboration in oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 57-85, April.
  9. Inderst, Roman & Wey, Christian, 2003. " Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  10. Anna Khmelnitskaya, 2010. "Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(4), pages 657-669, October.
  11. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
  12. Rachel E. Kranton & Deborah F. Minehart, 2001. "A Theory of Buyer-Seller Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 485-508, June.
  13. Zissimos, Ben, 2002. "WHY ARE TRADE AGREEMENTS REGIONAL? A Theory Based on Noncooperative Networks," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 652, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  14. Jackson, Matthew O., 2005. "Allocation rules for network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 128-154, April.
  15. Suresh Mutuswami & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 479.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  16. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks," Microeconomics 0211011, EconWPA.
  17. Hans Haller & Sudipta Sarangi, 2003. "Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 337, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  18. Perea, Andrés & Navarro, Noemí, 2001. "Bargaining in networks and the myerson value," UC3M Working papers. Economics we016121, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  19. Sergio Currarini, 2003. "On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2003.19, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  20. Francis Bloch & Matt Jackson, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Side Payments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 198, Econometric Society.
  21. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2004. "Negotiating the membership," Game Theory and Information 0409003, EconWPA.
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