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Citations for "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity"

by Jeffery Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis

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  1. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  2. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  3. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175255, HAL.
  4. Mas, Alexandre & Moretti, Enrico, 2006. "Peers at Work," IZA Discussion Papers 2292, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Herrmann Benedikt & Simon Gachter, 2006. "The limits of self-governance in the presence of spite: Experimental evidence from urban and rural russia," Artefactual Field Experiments 00048, The Field Experiments Website.
  6. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  7. Peter Marko & Petr Svarc, 2008. "Firms formation and growth in the model with heterogeneous agents and monitoring," Working Papers IES 2008/31, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2008.
  8. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January.
  9. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2007. "What Norms Trigger Punishment," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0708, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  10. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September.
  11. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006.
  12. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek's legacy," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00346389, HAL.
  13. Costa, Francisco, 2005. "An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team," MPRA Paper 2958, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Ricardo Crespo, 2008. "Reciprocity and practical comparability," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 13-28, April.
  15. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012. "Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
  16. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2004. "Collective action in the commons: A theoretical framework for empirical research," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-21, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  17. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  18. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  19. Stefan Grosse & Louis Putterman & Bettina Rockenbach, 2007. "Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis," Working Papers 2007-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  20. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
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