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Citations for "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity"

by Jeffery Carpenter & Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis

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  1. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2007. "L'Analyse Economique des Normes Sociales: una Réévaluation de l'Héritage Hayékien," ICER Working Papers 45-2007, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
  2. Costa, Francisco, 2005. "An experimental analysis of moral hazard in team," MPRA Paper 2958, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Ricardo Crespo, 2008. "Reciprocity and practical comparability," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 13-28, April.
  4. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Maitra, Pushkar, 2012. "Moral hazard and peer monitoring in a laboratory microfinance experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 192-209.
  5. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  6. Alexandre Mas & Enrico Moretti, 2009. "Peers at Work," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 112-45, March.
  7. Visser, Martine & Burns, Justine, 2006. "Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers in Economics 219, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  8. Gächter, Simon & Herrmann, Benedikt, 2006. "The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia," IZA Discussion Papers 2236, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  9. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste, 2009. "The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 259-279, September.
  10. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00179979, HAL.
  11. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2009. "What norms trigger punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 272-288, September.
  12. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October.
  13. David Masclet, 2003. "L'analyse de l'influence de la pression des pairs dans les équipes de travail," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-35, CIRANO.
  14. Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  16. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
  17. Stefan Grosse & Louis Putterman & Bettina Rockenbach, 2007. "Monitoring In Teams: A Model and Experiment on the Central Monitor Hypothesis," Working Papers 2007-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  18. Peter Marko & Petr Svarc, 2008. "Firms formation and growth in the model with heterogeneous agents and monitoring," Working Papers IES 2008/31, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Nov 2008.
  19. Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2004. "Collective action in the commons: A theoretical framework for empirical research," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-21, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  20. Fangfang Tan, 2008. "Punishment in a Linear Public Good Game with Productivity Heterogeneity," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 269-293, September.
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