IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes"

by Sliwka, Dirk

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Grout, Paul & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2008. "Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment," IZA Discussion Papers 3685, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Friebel, Guido & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2011. "Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 1-13, April.
  3. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, . "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers 250, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  4. Wendelin Schnedler, 2009. "You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses, Perceived Income, and Effort," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 09/226, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  5. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2008. "Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 990-1008, June.
  6. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, 2005. "Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats," CESifo Working Paper Series 1379, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Schnedler, Wendelin & Vadovic, Radovan, 2007. "Legitimacy of Control," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-61, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  8. Bernd Irlenbusch, 2006. "Are non-binding contracts really not worth the paper?," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 21-40.
  9. Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs," CEPR Discussion Papers 7658, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Rose, Timothy & Manley, Karen, 2011. "Motivation toward financial incentive goals on construction projects," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(7), pages 765-773, July.
  11. Oliver Gürtler, 2008. "Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 177-189, July.
  12. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2012. "Rewarding carrots and crippling sticks: Eliciting employee preferences for the optimal incentive design," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1247-1265.
  13. Falk, Armin & Kosfeld, Michael, 2004. "Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 4512, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2009. "Rewarding Carrots & Crippling Sticks: Eliciting Employee Preferences for the Optimal Incentive Mix in Europe," MPRA Paper 14167, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Gürtler, Oliver, 2006. "Implicit Contracts: Two Different Approaches," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 110, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Patricia Crifo & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2004. "Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding Out Toward Users," CESifo Working Paper Series 1316, CESifo Group Munich.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.