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Citations for "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations"

by Tirole, Jean

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  1. S. Guriev & G. Egorov & K. Sonin., 2007. "Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives, and the Resource Curse," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.
  2. Kong-Pin Chen, 2005. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
  3. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 1967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Wane, Waly, 2000. "Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2394, The World Bank.
  5. Jason G. Cummins & Ingmar Nyman, 2005. "The Dark Side of Competitive Pressure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 361-397, Summer.
  6. Ingela Alger, 2006. "Optimal Debt Contracts when Credit Managers are (Perhaps) Corruptible," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 648, Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Pestieau, P., . "Interregional redistribution through tax surcharge," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1218, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Jinyoung Hwang & Neville Nien-Heui Jiang & Ping Wang, 2002. "Financial Collusion and Over-Lending," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0229, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Oct 2003.
  9. Edward Simpson Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, 2006. "Firms as Clubs in Walrasian Markets with Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 644-671, August.
  10. Bennedsen, Morten, 1999. "Political Ownership," Working Papers 11-1999, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  11. BORDIGNON, Massimo & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Rules transparency and political accountability," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 25, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  13. repec:dgr:kubcen:199548 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Michele Polo & Piero Tedeschi, . "Equilibrium and Renegotiation in Delegation Games," Working Papers 116, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  15. Marianne Bertrand & Simeon Djankov & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2006. "Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers?," NBER Working Papers 12274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Marcel Boyer & Tracy Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996. "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-27, CIRANO.
  17. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  18. Kouroche Vafaï, 1999. "A Theory of Abuse of Authority in Hierarchies," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-07, CIRANO.
  19. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
  20. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2006. "Screening Ethics When Honest Agents Care About Fairness ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 59-85, 02.
  21. Walter A Cont, 2001. "Essays on Contract Design: Delegation and Agency Problems, and Monitoring Under Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000122, David K. Levine.
  22. Dessi, Roberta, 2004. "Start-up Finance, Monitoring and Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 264, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  23. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
  24. Jonathan Conning, 2005. "Monitoring by Peers or by Delegates? Joint Liability Loans and Moral Hazard," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 407, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  25. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.
  26. Michela Cella, 2005. "Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers` Hierachy," Economics Series Working Papers 233, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  27. repec:dgr:kubcen:199560 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  29. R. Strausz, 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION)," Game Theory and Information 9510002, EconWPA, revised 03 Apr 1996.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.