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Citations for "Truth or Consequences? Enforcing Pollution Standards"

by McKenna, C.J. & Livernois, J.

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  1. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2008. "Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 1-21, March.
  2. Guerrero, Santiago & Innes, Robert, 2008. "Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6204, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  3. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2007. "Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random," CESifo Working Paper Series 1966, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. John Spraggon, 1998. "Exogenous Targeting Instruments as a Solution to Group Moral Hazards," Department of Economics Working Papers 1998-01, McMaster University.
  5. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
  6. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August.
  7. Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & McKitrick, Ross & Rollins, Kimberly S., 1999. "Optimal Compensation For Endangered Species Protection Under Asymmetric Information," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21693, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  8. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October.
  9. Helfand, Gloria E. & Berck, Peter & Maull, Tim, 2003. "The theory of pollution policy," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 249-303 Elsevier.
  10. maurice moffett & alok k. bohara & kishore gawande, 2005. "Governance and Performance: Theory-Based Evidence from US Coast Guard Inspections," Public Economics 0505002, EconWPA.
  11. John K. Stranlund & James J. Murphy & John M. Spraggon, 2010. "An Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets," Working Papers 2010-3, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  12. Sarah L. Stafford, 2006. "Self-Policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime," Working Papers 26, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  13. Arun Malik, 2007. "The Desirability of Forgiveness in Regulatory Enforcement," Working Papers 2008-14, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
  14. Christian Langpap, 2007. "Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 57-81, February.
  15. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August.
  16. Khanna Madhu & Widyawati Diah, 2011. "Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 125-160, May.
  17. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2003. "The Role of Warnings in Regulation: Keeping Control with Less Punishment," Memorandum 24/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  18. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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