IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "A note on the incentive compatible core"

by F. Forges & E. Minelli

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as
in new window

  1. Biran, Omer & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 52-64, September.
  2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/167 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
  4. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/166 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Omer Biran, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," Working Papers halshs-00608008, HAL.
  9. FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," CORE Discussion Papers 2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
  11. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  12. Françoise Forges & Ram Orzach, 2010. "Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values," Working Papers 2010.119, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  13. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  14. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4100 is not listed on IDEAS
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.