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Citations for "A note on the incentive compatible core"

by F. Forges & E. Minelli

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  1. S D Flåm & L Koutsougeras, 2005. "Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0512, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  2. Orzach, Ram & Forges, Françoise, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7891, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
  4. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Forges, Françoise & Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4100, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Hara, Chiaki, 2002. "The anonymous core of an exchange economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 91-116, September.
  8. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
  9. Biran, Omer, 2011. "Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities," MPRA Paper 32164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/167, Paris Dauphine University.
  11. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
  13. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
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