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Citations for "Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring"

by Bhaskar, V. & van Damme, Eric

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  1. George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2001. "Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000257, David K. Levine.
  2. Bhaskar, V. & Obara, Ichiro, 2002. "Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 40-69, January.
  3. Bergemann, Dirk & Valimaki, Juuso, 2002. "Strategic Buyers and Privately Observed Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 469-482, August.
  4. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998. "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres rep-is-sep, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  5. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  6. Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. " Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-robustness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 319-47, March.
  7. William Fuchs, 2005. "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," Discussion Papers 04-012, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  8. Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1265, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  10. Stephen Morris & George J Mailath, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," 2005 Meeting Papers 25, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  11. Michihiro Kandori, 2001. "Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-114, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  12. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 515-528, July.
  13. V Bhaskar & George J Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January.
  15. Bhaskar, V., 2009. "Commitment and observability in a contracting environment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 708-720, July.
  16. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 0. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  17. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
  18. V. Bhaskar, 2005. "Commitment and Observability in an Economic Environment," Economics Discussion Papers 596, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  19. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  20. Michihiro Kandori, 2011. "Weakly Belief‐Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 877-892, 05.
  21. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.