IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information"

by Sorin, Sylvain

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as
in new window

  1. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Evans, Robert & Thomas, Jonathan P, 2001. "Cooperation and Punishment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1061-1075, July.
  3. O. Gossner & N. Vieille, 2000. "Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information," THEMA Working Papers 2000-27, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Post-Print halshs-00754314, HAL.
  5. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
  6. Cripps,M.W. & Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 2002. "Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations," Working papers 17, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, EconWPA.
  8. George Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," Economics Working Papers 0054, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  9. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  10. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
  11. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  12. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Colin, Stewart, 2011. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian testing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 2029-2041, September.
  14. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00754608, HAL.
  15. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  16. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.