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Citations for "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information"

by Sorin, Sylvain

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  1. Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 May 2003.
  3. Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Post-Print hal-00464978, HAL.
  4. Colin Stewart, 2009. "Nonmanipulable Bayesian Testing," Working Papers tecipa-360, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  5. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
  6. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
  7. Jonathan P. Thomas & Martin Cripps, 2000. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Game Theory and Information 0004003, EconWPA.
  8. Evans, Robert & Thomas, Jonathan P, 2001. "Cooperation and Punishment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1061-75, July.
  9. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 24-32, January.
  11. Egorov, Georgy & Sonin, Konstantin, 2005. "The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Non-Democratic Succession," CEPR Discussion Papers 5092, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  14. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Sandroni, Alvaro & Smorodinsky, Rann & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2010. "Testing theories with learnable and predictive representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2203-2217, November.
  15. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  16. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2013. "Reputations in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-034, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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