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Citations for "Optimal Tariffs and the Choice of Technology Discriminatory Tariffs vs. the "Most Favored Nation" Clause"

by Choi, J.P.

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  1. To, Ted, 1998. "Dynamics and Discriminatory Import Policy," CSGR Working papers series 07/98, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation (CSGR), University of Warwick.
  2. Rodney Ludema & Taizo Takeno, 2006. "Tariffs and the Adoption of Clean Technology Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2002. "GATT-think," Discussion Papers 0102-39, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  4. Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, 2008. "Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?," Development Working Papers 254, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  5. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2001. "Economic and legal aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation clause," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 233-279, June.
  6. Saggi, Kamal, 2004. "Tariffs and the most favored nation clause," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 341-368, July.
  7. Jay Pil Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, 2008. "Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 2390, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Tsuyoshi Toshimitsu, 2012. "Free Trade, Time-Consistent Tariff, and Market Size: The Role of GATT/WTO as Commitment Devices," Discussion Paper Series 79, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jan 2012.
  9. Saggi, Kamal & Sengul, Faruk & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2007. "Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 543-562.
  10. Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Weak Versus Strong Net Neutrality," NBER Working Papers 20160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2004. "Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 467-485, Autumn.
  12. Cebi, Pinar & Ludema, Rodney, 2002. "The Rise and Fall of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause," Working Papers 15853, United States International Trade Commission, Office of Economics.
  13. Missios, Paul & Yildiz, Halis Murat, 2006. "The role of MFN under asymmetries in environmental standards," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 297-304, November.
  14. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2004. "Backward Stealing and Forward Manipulation in the WTO," NBER Working Papers 10420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Saggi, Kamal, 2009. "The MFN clause, welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 132-143, January.
  16. Hsiu-Li Chen, 2000. "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas with Endogenous Technology Choice," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 25(2), pages 55-67, December.
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