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Citations for "Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma"

by V Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris

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  1. repec:pra:mprapa:64485 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2009. "A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  3. Yuval Heller, 2017. "Instability of Belief-free Equilibria," Working Papers 2017-01, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
  4. V.V. Bhaskar, 2007. "Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," 2007 Meeting Papers 136, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000340, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. George J. Mailath & Wojciech Olszewski, 2008. "Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  7. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
  8. Sugaya, Takuo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2013. "Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1891-1928.
  9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:58:p:1-16 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Heller, Yuval, 2015. "Instability of Equilibria with Imperfect Private Monitoring," MPRA Paper 64468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2009. "A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 802-824, March.
  12. Harrington, Joseph E. & Zhao, Wei, 2012. "Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 277-289.
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