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Citations for "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders"

by Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay

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  1. Prüfer, J. & Zetland, D., 2007. "An Auction Market for Journal Articles," Discussion Paper 2007-027, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  2. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Dobzinski, Shahar & Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam, 2012. "Multi-unit auctions with budget limits," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 486-503.
  4. Hafalir, Isa E. & Ravi, R. & Sayedi, Amin, 2012. "A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 699-708.
  5. Roberto Burguet & R. Preston McAfee, 2008. "License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 745.08, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2008. "The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible," Working Papers 2072/13264, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  7. Verwer, S. & Zhang, Y., 2011. "Revenue Prediction in Budget-constrained Sequential Auctions with Complementarities," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2011-020-LIS, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
  8. repec:dgr:uvatin:20080017 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Rica Gonen & Anat Lerner, 2013. "The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(4), pages 690-710, November.
  10. Carolyn Pitchik, 2008. "Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information," Working Papers tecipa-342, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  11. Ujhelyi, Gergely, 2009. "Campaign finance regulation with competing interest groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(3-4), pages 373-391, April.
  12. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Privately Known Budget Constraints," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000373, UCLA Department of Economics.
  13. Fang, Hanming & Parreiras, Sergio O., 2002. "Equilibrium of Affiliated Value Second Price Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders: The Two-Bidder Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 215-236, May.
  14. Kai Konrad, 2012. "Information alliances in contests with budget limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 679-693, June.
  15. Youngwoo Koh, 2013. "Keyword auctions with budget-constrained bidders," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 307-321, December.
  16. repec:dgr:uvatin:2008017 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. repec:dgr:kubcen:200222 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2009. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 105-124, January.
  19. Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2007. "Contests with limited resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 738-748, September.
  20. Megidish, Reut & Sela, Aner, 2011. "Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 8383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Anat Lerner & Rica Gonen, 2014. "Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 5(2), pages 97-115, April.
  22. Reut Megidish & Aner Sela, 2014. "Sequential contests with synergy and budget constraints," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 215-243, January.
  23. Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  24. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & Leslie M. Marx, 2008. "The `Google Effect' in the FCC's 700 MHz Auction," Department of Economics Working Papers 08-03, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  25. Alcalde, Jose & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "On the Complete Information First--Price Auction and its Intuitive Solution," MPRA Paper 22306, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  26. Burkett, Justin, 0. "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  27. Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z.F., 2011. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Paper 2011-096, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  28. Vogel, Edgar, 2014. "MRO bidding in the presence of LTROs: an empirical analysis of the pre-crisis period," Working Paper Series 1753, European Central Bank.
  29. Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 13/31, Department of Economics, University of York.
  30. Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
  31. Ganesh Iyer & Amit Pazgal, 2008. "Procurement bidding with restrictions," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-204, June.
  32. repec:dgr:kubcen:2011096 is not listed on IDEAS
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