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Citations for "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria"

by Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric

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  1. Miller, Nolan H., 1997. "Efficiency in Partnerships with Joint Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 285-299, December.
  2. Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 281, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Osório-Costa, António M., 2009. "Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time," MPRA Paper 13105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1984. "Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 726, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Legros, Patrick & Matthews, Steven A, 1993. "Efficient and Nearly-Efficient Partnerships," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 599-611, July.
  6. Zhang, Wenzhang & Chan, Jimmy H., 0. "Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  7. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
  8. van Damme, E.E.C. & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  10. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 151-188, January.
  11. Dilip Abreu & Paul Milgrom & David Pearce, 1997. "Information and timing in repeated partnerships," Levine's Working Paper Archive 636, David K. Levine.
  12. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Grigory Kosenok, 2009. "Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 95-121, September.
  13. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2003. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-255, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  14. David Rahman, 2014. "The Power of Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3737-51, November.
  15. Yuki Kumagai, 2010. "Networks and Markets. The dynamic impacts of information, matching and transaction costs on trade," Discussion Papers 2010-07, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  16. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 2003. "Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 227-250, August.
  17. Andreas Blume & April Franco, 2002. "Learning from failure," Staff Report 299, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  18. David G. Pearce & Dilip Abreu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 920, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  19. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2013. "Folk Theorems, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Apr 2013.
  20. Battaglini, Marco, 2004. "Joint Production in Teams," CEPR Discussion Papers 4702, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. Flesch, János & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Repeated games with voluntary information purchase," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 126-145, May.
  22. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  23. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  24. Radner, Roy, 1989. "Dynamic Games in Organization Theory," Working Paper Series 228, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised Feb 1991.
  25. Eduardo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2006. "Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 113, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
  26. Harold L. Cole & Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2001. "Finite memory and imperfect monitoring," Staff Report 287, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  27. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 1998. "Efficiency in partnership structures," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 331-346, August.
  28. Kobayashi, Hajime & Ohta, Katsunori, 2012. "Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 636-647.
  29. Damien S.Eldridge, 2013. "A shirking theory of referrals," Working Papers 2013.01, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
  30. Joshua Herries & Daniel I. Rees & Jeffrey S. Zax, 2003. "Interdependence in worker productivity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(5), pages 585-604.
  31. Rafael Rob & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2006. "Reputation and turnover," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 341-361, 06.
  32. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
  33. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Repeated Games with Correlated Private Monitoring and Secret Price Cuts," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-154, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  34. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1998. "Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 311-336, November.
  35. Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-24, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  36. Steven R. Williams & Roy Radner, 1988. "Efficiency in Partnership When The Joint Output is Uncertain," Discussion Papers 760, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  37. Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2011. "Self-Commitment-Institutions and Cooperation in Overlapping Generations Games," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 073, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
  38. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  39. Magnoli Bocchi, Alessandro, 2008. "Rising growth, declining investment : the puzzle of the Philippines," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4472, The World Bank.
  40. Alistair Wilson & Hong Wu, 2014. "Dissolution of Partnerships in Infinitely Repeated Games," Working Papers 532, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2014.
  41. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1997. "Private observation and Communication and Collusion," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1256, David K. Levine.
  42. Johannes Horner & Takuo Sugaya & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2009. "Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for delta Approaching 1 and a Folk Theorem," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Aug 2010.
  43. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  44. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Roy Radner and Incentive Theory," Economics Working Papers 0004, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  45. Compte, Olivier, 2002. "On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 106-150, January.
  46. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2015. "Of the stability of partnerships when individuals have outside options, or why allowing exit is inefficient," Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-001, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  47. Blume, Andreas & Franco, April Mitchell, 2007. "Decentralized learning from failure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 504-523, March.
  48. Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
  49. Holcomb, James H. & Nelson, Paul S., 1997. "The role of monitoring in duopoly market outcomes," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 79-93.
  50. Ichiro Obara, 2000. "Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1449, Econometric Society.
  51. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  52. Miyagawa, Eiichi & Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2008. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 192-221, March.
  53. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Muriel Niederle & Josef Perktold, 2000. "Market Institutions and Quality Enforcement," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1482, Econometric Society.
  54. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-97, October.
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